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I.   Introduction  
This is a report on the life, and reported near-death, of one of the most powerful concepts in 
recent European political history: cooperative security.1  Europe is where the concept originated, 
blossomed, and has experienced its greatest tests and successes.  However, neither its intellectual 
parents nor the practitioners who found it so useful in their efforts to shape a new post-Cold War 
international order would concede that cooperative security is a concept restricted by geographic 
limits.  As they see it, Europe is the first, but not the only, region where the principles of 
cooperative security can be applied.  They would also reject the cultural bounds suggested by 
critics – that it is a concept reserved only for advanced/democratic societies, with enough 
prosperity and social harmony to allow for consensus and confidence. 
There are many different explanations and claims about how the Cold War ended and why 
Europe, long the cockpit of war and violence, has now been transformed into a harmonious 
political landscape.  Realists and Reaganites find the major cause of the change in the collapse of 
the Soviet state, unable ultimately to reform its sinking economic system or to answer the great 
challenge of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  Supporters of inevitable American primacy 
see the triumph of irresistible American values, of democracy and its commitment to cooperation 
and problem solving.  Others, followers of integration theory, affirm Jean Monnet’s basic 
principles: that routine, continuous interaction, even amongst enemies, brings about the building 
of trust and the search for converging, if not common, interests.  Most ardent perhaps are the 
advocates of civil society practices and human rights: they argue that change came slowly but 
surely from below, and in spite of, the state level, as populations in Eastern Europe sought and 
reacted to cross-border initiatives and ultimately designed their own revolutions. 
Whatever the claims, Europe is now almost completely whole and free.  Armies no longer face 
off across the Central European plain.  Few border disputes remain and few populations are now 
subject to repression, fear, hostility, or systematic mistreatment.  It is the application of the 
principles of cooperative security that has led to a far different Europe than one could have 
dreamed about in 1989.  There is more than enough praise and credit for this to go around – for 
personalities from Gorbachev and Yeltsin to Reagan and Bush and groups such as the opposition 
East Germans, the determined Hungarians under Gyula Horn, and even the ever-ambiguous 
Czechs.  There are hot spots still on the periphery, but Europe is a zone of peace.  This is not the 
result of striking a new balance of power; it is even less related to dreams of a European 
supranational entity based on integration or world government.  
Europe is a space inhabited by sovereign states with varying levels of trust in one another, which 
have chosen and continue to choose a different way of co-existence and mutual reassurance 
                                                            
1 This essay was prepared in response to an invitation by the Center for International Security Studies – Maryland under the 
Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security program funded by the MacArthur Foundation, to review and expand on my work 
at the Brookings Institution in the mid-1990s. It benefited greatly from the comments of John Steinbruner, Nancy Gallagher 
and Jonas Siegel, colleagues at Maryland; and talented critics Judith Reppy, Janne Nolan, and Peter Dombrowski.  I am 
appreciative, too, to Simon Moore, MPP, Maryland  and Eric Auner for research and editing help.  My appreciation also to  
Scott L Warren, Roland Jacob, and Marylanders: Philip Maxon, Benjamin Loehrke, Anya Loukianova, Wes Neuman, and 




within a region that was so often the site of great violence and cruelty.  The national actors in this 
space have done so – not always elegantly or proficiently but generally with non-violent 
resolution – in the face of continuing crisis flares on the periphery – in the Balkans, in the 
Caucasus, in the Baltic region, in Georgia, and in Ukraine.  
The argument here is that these European states have been able to coexist peacefully precisely 
because Europe and its transatlantic/Eurasian frameworks have developed new habits of 
transparency, mutual confidence, and a regard of violence as a last resort, undergirded by a 
persistent trend toward institutionalization and constant communication at all societal levels.  
This is not the result of the West’s victory.  Europe has often been the site for experiments in 
cooperative security structures; when successful it has been a beacon for others to follow, though 
when results have been less impressive, others have also taken note.  Two decades of 
experimentation and debate have produced few close parallels to any of the specific structures in 
Europe.  But the technologies of transparency and verification are being honed there for all to 
see, with lessons to be drawn as others choose. 
But there is still more to do in Europe:  
 to help develop effective forums for another attempt at cooperation with a 
transformed Russia, even as it experiences internal political turmoil and doubts about 
the future course of the European experiment; 
 to smooth and offset recent US-EU turbulence as post-Lisbon Europe becomes a 
global foreign policy player and faces new fiscal and geopolitical challenges, including 
a debt crisis that threatens the future of European institutions;  
 to provide new tools for managing Europe's unstable periphery;  
 to overcome the long-neglected gaps in Eurasian resource tussles, in energy 
demand and supply, and in the inequitable balance of access and assured supply; and  
 to modernize, if not overhaul, arms control and confidence-building measures in 
Europe, to reduce the risks of conflict, military accident, and repression given the threats 
of the 21st century.  
This essay attempts a second interim assessment of the concept of cooperative security, its 
impact on the future of European security, and its potential generalization to issues beyond arms 
control and to other non-European areas, revisiting themes developed in my 1994-1995 work for 
the Brookings Institution.2  It will look first at the concept and how it has been critically assessed 
over the last twenty years.  It will ask whether the model can be replicated, and demonstrate that 
there is much to suggest that such replication should be attempted.  It will then examine three of 
the core elements in its development and in its evolution.  There will also be a review of test 
cases in the present, particularly the challenges faced in a future wave of arms control 
negotiations, and in the construction of a missile defense system against rogue or terrorist attack 
on Europe.  Moreover, there are new and difficult areas for global applications and for further 
broadening and deepening the reach and grasp within Europe, such as the battles against 
                                                            
2  Kelleher, Catherine, The Future of European Security, Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1995 and Kelleher, Catherine in 





proliferation risks and against homegrown and external bases of terrorist activity.  Finally, there 
are the new economic threats, exemplified by Europe’s search for energy security.  
 
II. Cooperative Security  
The Origins of Cooperative Security 
Cooperative security originated during what we now know was the final decade of Cold War. Its 
roots stretch back to 1970s and early-1980s thinking about the intractable Cold War stalemate in 
Europe, particularly between the United States and Russia, but also between what was then 
defined as Western and Eastern Europe.3 The root concept – and still our core definition 
throughout this essay – was to find a long-term, persistent political basis for cooperative action 
on issues and events seen as likely causes of great risk while simultaneously finding and creating 
new barriers to future armed conflict and nuclear war.     
These sources of risk might manifest themselves as political turbulence both within and across 
borders, and could become triggers to conflict and military escalation in an arena of high 
armament and political stalemate. The key policy prescriptions included commitments to stable 
engagement and the search for full transparency of action and intention, even if achievement of 
those levels have to be aspirational goals, not expected operational realities.  The scope of 
cooperation and agreement might be limited at first, but over time, a widening pool of 
converging interests and cooperative practices would emerge, as cooperation and particularly 
persistent communication and interaction proved a welcome way to lower tension and costs.  The 
mutual interest would be served by lowering risk, and by containing or even preventing sources 
of tension and strife without a demand that any party had to capitulate or sacrifice its long-term 
visions.  As one of the principal intellectual architects of the idea, John Steinbruner, described it: 
the hope was that on a progression of issues, “a political deal could be struck in which each side 
improved its security and relieved its long-term investment burden at the cost of adjusting long-
established planning assumptions and habits of unilateral decision-making on matters of mutual 
security.”4  
The result in Europe was a series of open procedures, routine dialogues, and multilateral 
institutions of cooperation, which included all of the states of Europe and committed each, at 
least rhetorically, to the search for cooperation and transparency in security decision-making.5  
                                                            
3 Some of the earliest thinking was European and focused on the concept of common or non-zero security, particularly 
highlighted in the works of the Palme Commission and its publications in the 1980s. The Carnegie Corporation of New York 
and especially its then president, Dr. David Hamburg, were keenly interested in the concept and supported conceptual and 
policy development at several key institutions: at Brookings under John Steinbruner, head of Foreign Policy Studies and 
Janne Nolan; at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) and the work of William J.  Perry; 
and at Harvard’s Belfer Center, especially the efforts of Ashton Carter.  
4  Steinbruner, John, “The Prospect of Cooperative Security,” The Brookings Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter, 1988/1989), p. 60. 
5  Cf. Mandelbaum, Michael, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, Twentieth Century Fund, 1996; and Evangelista, Matthew, 




The first and most expansive organization became the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE).  It emerged from the Helsinki process in the 1970s as an entity that stressed 
the importance of economic and human rights issues for security, as well as military security 
requirements.  It also affirmed the principle of peaceful alterations to borders that nurtured 
German reunification and the “Velvet Divide” of Czechoslovakia (see the list of OSCE members 
in Appendix 1).  Others ranged from the German-East European dialogues initiated by Willy 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the early 1970s to the arms control negotiations that resulted in the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which constrained the forces and the deadliest 
arms deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.  Analysts and politicians alike spoke 
of an emerging European security architecture, in which transparency and communication would 
mitigate and perhaps eventually supplant the human and material costs of Europe’s division. 
In these dying days of the Cold War, few scholars, analysts, or participants foresaw the 
momentous events that were about to reshape the world.  It was at this time that Gorbachev’s 
Soviet Union was exploring a new approach to security strategy, based not on unilateral policy 
making responding to and anticipating American actions, but rather on forming, in negotiations 
with the United States, a new security entente.6  Many now see that the 1986 meeting in 
Reykjavik between Gorbachev and Reagan was the turning point. The most formal hallmarks of 
the new cooperative security efforts were the interlinked complex of declarations and practices. 
These included treaty agreements on mutual strategic arms reductions and intermediate nuclear 
forces (START and INF), and the formal, tactical nuclear unilateral initiatives we now refer to as 
the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs).  A core step for Europe was the negotiation of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which formalized the military balance between 
NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.  It set upper limits on the size and regional constraints on 
the deployment and movement for the critical military forces (5 specific weapons categories 
termed TLEs), both of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and provided for a groundbreaking system 
of annual data reporting from a declared baseline and for what is now approaching 6,000 
inspections.7, 8 Around this core flowed secondary “deepening” agreements (e.g. the Open Skies 
Convention for aerial inspections). 
Changes within OSCE came to constitute what Rüdiger Hartmann, a longtime German diplomat 
and OSCE representative, calls the second circle of cooperative security in Europe: the 
confidence and security building measures (CSBM), which encompass formal as well as 
                                                            
6  Drell, Sidney and George Shultz, Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on its Twentieth Anniversary (Hoover Institution 
Press: Stanford, 2007); and Shultz, George, Sidney Drell, and James Goodby, Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World 
Free of Nuclear Weapons (Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, 2008). 
7  TLE—Treaty Limited Equipment, the unit measurement agreed to under CFE which denotes “one” of the weapons to be 
subject to maximum holding level and geographic deployment patterns specified in the treaty. The five types of TLE are 
tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Arms Control Asssociation, The 
Conventional Armed Forcees in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe. ) 
8  Inspections were both on-site with regular notice and the most extensive ever provisions for no-notice challenge inspections 
– both involving teams of mixed nationality, all formally trained to the same standards. See Kelleher, Catherine, Jane Sharp 
and Lawrence Freedman (eds.), The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms 




informal elements of transparency and joint action.9  One of the first moves was the creation of 
the Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC) within the OSCE in 1992.  The final piece was the 
Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures, formally agreed to in 1999, 
but worked on continuously before then and frequently amended since.  It encompasses formal 
agreements on information exchanges on force strengths, and procedures for consultations in the 
case of unusual military activity, and prior notification of large-scale military activity, especially 
large-scale exercises.  
Far more consequential in the longer-term, though, were the political changes occurring 
throughout the continent.  The opening of borders in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to allow 
for the free flow of information and persons and the increasing attraction of cross-border 
democratic opposition groups were almost miraculous in their positive security effects.  That 
growing dynamic rolled on to what seemed ever new heights, with no violence across borders 
and minimal amounts internally, usually directed against the forces of oppression under the 
previous Communist states who would not believe their time had gone.  The end of the first 
phase was the medley of peaceful revolutions of 1989-1990 in CEE, the de facto dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact, and the transformation in 1991 of the Soviet Union into Russia and a series of 
new independent states, most of which at least initially rejected close alliance with Russia and 
turned westward.  
These events provided the framework of the concepts invoked for cooperative security in 
Europe.  The goals in the second phase (1992-present) include securing the peace – ensuring that 
the promises of cooperation and transparency would not be undermined in the re-nationalization 
of defense and security that might follow, or in the mistaken belief that all of Europe’s security 
challenges had been resolved.  The near-term challenge has largely become that of finding a role 
for Russia: its changed status, and the likelihood that it would become a full participant in the 
cooperative security process and not return to the brutal practices of the Stalinist era, or the 
traditional power diplomacy of administrations from Khrushchev through Brezhnev.  The longer-
term view also folds in the challenges that may eventually spark and sustain conflict:  resurgent 
nationalism and exclusionism throughout Europe, pockets of conflict on the periphery, the 
growing disparities in income and prosperity within the region, or the continuing riddles of 
ethnicity and immigration.10  
What does cooperative engagement now require?  How far is transparency and communication 
assured given centuries of Russian tendencies towards secrecy and the defense of ultimate 
sovereignty, and four decades of East-West hostility and ideological battle?  Few in the West 
were able to conceive of Russian membership in a European framework, let alone a security 
alliance like NATO. Why would it want to join the network?  How would it be balanced?  Or 
would it be given a special status by its former allies and enemies, with special interests to be 
protected in its claimed “near abroad” in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries?  These 
questions are still relevant and important in the larger geopolitical framework. 
                                                            
9  Hartmann, Rüdiger, “The CFE Treaty: Can Europe do Without Cooperative Security?” in Zellner, Wolfgang, Hans-Joachim 
Schmidt, and Götz Neuneck (eds), The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2009). 





Definitional Debates in the Evolving Literature  
Much of the substantive refinement of the intellectual concepts involved in this paper’s 
definition of cooperative security was developed in a series of Brookings Institution research 
efforts throughout the 1990s, which gained considerable attention in Washington during the 
Clinton Administration. In one of the earliest papers, William Kaufmann and John Steinbruner 
described cooperative security as “inherently more efficient than unregulated national 
competition... [T]he key to that efficiency is reduced uncertainty.”11  Two years later, 
Steinbruner, writing with two who became key figures in the Clinton Defense 
Department, William Perry and Ashton Carter, observed: 
The central purpose of cooperative security arrangements is to prevent war and to do so primarily by 
preventing the means for successful aggression from being assembled, thus also obviating the need for 
states so threatened to make their own counterpreparations...Cooperative security differs from the 
traditional idea of collective security as preventive medicine differs from acute care.12 
The ambiguities in cooperative arrangements also shifted the emphasis of international relations 
from a military/security dimension to a political/legal calculus.  In a conventional alliance, an 
aggressor is easily identified as an entity outside the alliance transgressing the alliance’s borders. 
In a cooperative arrangement, the potential aggressor is not specified at the organizing point or 
for all time; it is behavior that defines an aggressor within the arrangement—much as it is within 
a state.  Determining whether an act of aggression has occurred is a quasi-legal step, often with 
the alleged aggressor and alleged victims among the adjudicators.  The judgment on the penalty 
to be imposed and paid is frequently left until the occasion of an alleged attack arises.13  
It was precisely on this point that perhaps the most skepticism and indeed hostility to the 
cooperative security concept was expressed in Washington and occasionally in Europe as well.  
Henry Kissinger and those in and out of government who saw themselves as “realists” argued 
that at its core, aggression flowed from relative power: Russia whatever its present labels or 
weaknesses would re-emerge and continue as the principal challenge to be faced over the coming 
decades in Europe. 14  Others such as Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that a sufficient basis of trust 
with the Russians did not and would not exist given their history, their authoritarian political 
culture, and their essential non-European/non-Western character.  Without a common fundament 
of values and ideals, cooperative security would not be possible.  Neither Russia nor perhaps 
eventually a resurgent Germany would ever accept being a “larger Switzerland,” willing over the 
                                                            
11 Kaufmann, William and John Steinbruner, Decisions for Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1991) p. 
68. 
12 Carter, Ashton, William Perry, and John Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1993). 
13  Kissinger, Henry, Years of Renewal (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1999), pp. 635-636. 
14  Robert Gates gave a number of telling speeches in the late Bush years, including one where I was present at the National 
Defense University, in which he argued Russia under Gorbachev was constructing Potemkin villages of peaceful cooperation 




long-term to limit its choices for political and eventual military dominance in its traditional 
sphere.  With the vigilance of a well-armed and present United States in Europe, Russia might 
for a time adhere to certain standards or be deterred.  But this could not be the basis for prudent 
policy planning for the future nor a reason for the United States to forego critical assets for its 
own defense or that of its allies.  Only idealists or the gullible would make such an argument. 
A third strand of argument was more existential.  It stressed rather that cooperative security 
would ultimately undermine the deterrence mechanism and allow states to lose their caution in 
interstate relations.  Converging values and a willingness to sacrifice present advantage in 
weaponry for long-term stability might work in the European region, with the legacy of World 
War II and shared postwar values.  But war and attack were still possibilities to be prepared for, 
and Europeans would be more and more affected by an integrating global system.  The use of 
force, and especially the use of nuclear force, might always be ultima ratio, but deterrence would 
also always depend on credibility, and therefore outward reliance on force and military 
preparations to be used if aggressors did not halt. 
Supporters of the concept however took heart at the initial efforts of the Clinton Administration 
to translate the concept to policy prescriptions, particularly for Europe.  Policy attention in 
Washington and in Europe in the 90s was largely devoted to assessing the organizational 
framework in Europe that would now be the most appropriate for the day-to-day practice of 
cooperative security.  A UN framework was briefly favored, but quickly seemed too tradition-
bound, too slow, and too cumbersome for effective action.  There were extensive debates about 
which security architecture was best; would NATO or the evolving EU represent the better 
alternative?  Furthermore, where would the neutrals and non-EU, non-NATO members fit in?   
The Bosnian conflict and the failures of the OSCE and the EU to end the bloodshed on Europe's 
threshold or even to mount conflict management operations led to disappointment and 
disillusionment about independent European decision making.  Only NATO was able to act to 
create a kind of peace, and then only slowly and with considerable difficulty and hesitation.  This 
was compounded by a reluctant Clinton Administration and major loss of life among civilians 
and combatants – a pattern repeated in Kosovo a few years later.  
The search to find a more satisfactory conceptual basis continued apace.  The Yugoslav wars of 
the 90s shook the most optimistic.  Both the EU and NATO apparently underestimated the 
political and diplomatic burden imposed by the decisions to expand their memberships, and the 
adjustments within each organization to the new patterns of obligation and reassurance, let alone 
decision making, often proved taxing. Hostility was often barely disguised between CEE states 
and Russia, and between Russia and the United States within military and bureaucratic 
interactions.  All these developments countered the earlier assumptions of an inevitable 
cooperative trend and the relatively quick transformation of cooperative security into something 
akin to Karl Deutsch’s security community.15 
                                                            
15  Deutsch, Karl et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical 




Two 2001 studies conducted at the NATO-affiliated Marshall Center illustrated the theoretical 
directions explored.  Richard Cohen noted that in some critical circles, cooperative security had 
acquired a reputation for idealism, perhaps to the detriment of practicality.16  He attempted to 
reformulate notions of what cooperative security entails, giving four criteria that a system must 
meet to fit the term – his method of “operationalizing” the term.  For him, an organization needs 
to have two conventional roles – (1) collective security, attempting to provide security from 
within for members of the organization and (2) collective defense, protecting members from 
external aggression – as well as two less common roles – (3) individual or “human” security, and 
(4) stability promotion.17  After defining the issue and criteria, not surprisingly, he determined 
NATO to be the only cooperative security organization presently operational.18  In contrast, 
Michael Mihalka gave a more open definition, describing cooperative security as “sustained 
efforts to reduce the risk of war that are not directed against a specific state or coalition of 
states” (emphasis mine).  This is distinct from simple cooperation or alliance, which is 
traditionally conceived as a common response against an external threat or threats.  He phrased it 
as a means of mitigating the “security dilemma” by short-circuiting the action-reaction cycle 
inherent to unilateral security decision making.19  As I do, he found no necessary organizational 
or legal format, and supported cooperative efforts through a variety of risk reduction strategies. 
Lionel Ponsard, writing in 2007, capped the argument by asserting, “Cooperative security does 
not mean that participants are treaty-bound to offer assistance.  If that were the case, we would 
speak about collective, not cooperative security.”20  Ponsard also stressed the relatively limited 
aims of cooperative security:  
[C]ooperative security does not aim at establishing global governance through the resolution of all 
conflicts. The attention is ‘on preventing the accumulation of the means for mass, deliberate and organized 
aggression, such as seizure of territory by force or the destruction of vital assets by remote bombardments 
for unilateral gain.’21 
Ponsard also observed that a cooperative security framework was particularly good for dealing 
with the challenges that Europe faces: transnational issues that require cooperation beyond the 
traditional state-to-state interaction, issues that at a minimum include nuclear proliferation, 
organized crime, terrorism, epidemics, and environmental disasters.  
                                                            
16  Cohen, Richard, Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability (George C Marshall European Center 
for Security Studies, 2001) p.1. 
17  Ibid, pp. 5-9. 
18  Ibid, p. 16. This is a judgment that few cooperative security first-phase supporters, myself included, would find satisfactory, 
because of Cohen’s disregard of looser multilateral methods (as in OSCE) or the interlocking networks of bilateral 
arrangements led by the United States. 
19  Mihalka, Michael, Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability (George C. Marshall European Center 
for Security Studies, 2001) p. 30. 
20  Ponsard, Lionel, Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security (New York: Routledge, 2007) p. 126. 




Later discussion about cooperative security too often simply equated the concept with 
cooperation in security of any kind.  It was invoked to substitute another term for positive 
diplomatic relations, or to suggest a choice other than peace or war.  In retrospect, it may also 
have been a case of the literature mirroring policy, since, as I argue below, the Bush 
Administration’s disdain for cooperation served at many levels to downgrade the concept itself 
(and arms control) and to ignore any new opportunities for which this policy approach might 
have been appropriate. 
 
Cooperative Threat Reduction as the New Model for Cooperative Security 
Several influential commentators, however, remained focused on the principles involved and 
have proposed an even broader definition of cooperative security.  Their summary judgment is 
that cooperative security as a concept has been transformed in policy experiences since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  First Michael Krepon and then Jeffrey Larsen and Lewis Dunn have suggested 
that cooperative security principles are really now those that are at the core of the Nunn-Lugar 
programs of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR).22  Established first under the Clinton 
Administration, these programs were originally devised to reduce the risks inherent in the 
dissolution of the Soviet nuclear establishment.  Efforts were initially confined only to the 
reduction and destruction of Soviet-era capabilities and facilities and the protection of human 
and material assets from diversion, re-use, or theft.  But almost from the outset, CTR enveloped a 
far wider agenda: re-education and re-training of personnel, frequent consultations about daily 
operations and constraints, the economic and scientific rehabilitation of closed cities, the joint 
securing of nuclear material stocks, large and small, and the enforcement of safety and security 
codes, to mention only the most prominent. Inspection and operational teams of American, 
Russian, and European scientists and officials worked on all aspects of the program and 
developed not only catalogs of best practices but also personal rapport and consistent experience 
of the benefits gained and the difficulties involved. 
Krepon and Dunn argue persuasively that CTR programs have taken transparency, verification, 
and information sharing to new levels and evolved not only broad principles but practical tool 
kits that go far beyond traditional negotiated arms control measures and provisions.  These are 
far richer, more suited to 21st century classes of threats, primarily terrorism and proliferation.  
CTR does demonstrate the fullest extent of cooperation, even though that level is not achievable 
or even politically feasible in all risk domains.  The inherent flexibility and capacity for “growth” 
of this conception of cooperative security goes far beyond the legalistic/diplomatic structures of 
its first phase.  Then the focus was on formal state-to-state interaction and primarily the U.S.-
Russian strategic competition.  The result was too-often rigid categories and tight monitoring and 
domestic demands for reassurance and compensation in other domains.   
                                                            
22  For the initial treatment see Krepon, Michael, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missiles Defense, and the Nuclear Future  
(Palgrave: New York, 2003) since extended in his most recent Better Safe than Sorry (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 
2009). Larsen's work has come in several contributions, especially in successive editions of the his arms control volumes 
edited with James Wirtz and entitled Arms Control and Cooperative Security (Lynn Rienner: Boulder, 2009, latest edition). 




For example, Dunn points to 5 classes of measures which function both to increase trust and 
confidence and to reinforce habits of cooperation, culminating in greater joint activity and 
engagement:  
1. Strategic dialogues, information exchanges; 
2. Visits, personal exchanges, liaison arrangements (military and civilian); 
3. Unilateral declarations, initiatives (PNIs); 
4. Joint programs and centers of long duration (Risk Reduction Centers, proposed 
data-exchange centers); and, 
5. Joint studies, experiments, and initiatives (PSI).23  
Although activities of these sorts have most often been funded and carried out in the United 
States by the Department of Defense and the Energy Department, Dunn, Krepon, and Larsen all 
argue that these are far broader classes of activities even though they don’t include every form of 
state-to-state cooperation.  These five are more quickly and easily coordinated with standard 
diplomatic moves than are treaty provisions, and may well become part of Track II approaches 
when formal political obstacles impede negotiation or agreement.24  They further develop 
parties’ understanding of each other’s interests and the need to avoid miscalculation, without 
assuming an instant or comprehensive convergence of interests.  Moreover, these measures have 
not taken as long to negotiate nor prompted the same level of confrontational Congressional 
review as, for example, the agreement on INF or on the multilateral chemical or biological 
weapons conventions did.  And while funding has not always been easy, these programs have 
survived and in some cases even flourished without high-level attention or fear of constant 
political damage.  
A 2008 study, “Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction,” 
carried out by the nonpartisan National Academies of Sciences’s Committee on International 
Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at the behest of Congress takes this analysis several steps 
further.25 CISAC takes as its starting point the ways in which these programs transcended their 
DOD-DOE base to become more effective and coordinated cross-governmental measures.  
Moreover, through frameworks such as the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, these programs can be generalized and regularized 
to enhance international partnerships.  
 
Reasons for the Apparent Decline of Cooperative Security 
The evolution noted above represents the views of a small, articulate, but still minority group. A 
reading of most recent policy literature suggests at the very least that the concept of cooperative 
                                                            
23 See Dunn in Larsen and Wirtz, op. cit.; p.177-183. 
24 Track II—non-official and non-binding negotiations or discussions, most often with  retired officials or individuals of 
political note, who can explore and propose solutions or compromises not permissible at the official level. 
25  Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Program, Global Security 





security has entered a period of semi-dormancy.  The concept seems only to be noticed by the 
decision-making classes when its everyday practice in Europe is challenged or undermined.  
Many attempts to apply the “European cure” to other regions have slowed, though not stopped – 
most notably, in the search for a framework within which to achieve greater transparency and 
cooperation in Asia without overarching rules and institutions, arguments to which we will return 
at the end of this essay.  
Why has this been so?  The list of factors is long, but four are paramount.  The first is an 
overwhelming sense of complacency in Europe itself, but especially in Western Europe, about 
the achievements that cooperative security has made possible.  It was never a concept that 
attracted vast public attention, and it is still in the hands of a very small and increasingly aged set 
of national experts in almost every country in Europe.  For most European populations, the 
problem of security centers on domestic security – against terrorists, disgruntled minorities, or 
disturbed citizens.  In all but a very small number of cases, popular fear of cross-border military 
attack in Europe is gone; the fear, if it exists at all, is at Europe’s periphery.  The number of overt 
security challenges – either domestic or interstate – in the traditional European space approaches 
zero.  War for almost all is unimaginable; arms on every side have been severely reduced and 
are, for the first time in at least two centuries, viewed as “unpopular” and “expensive.”  People, 
goods, and ideas flow freely and almost without restraint in the European space; only the 
exceptions – the persistent dictatorship in Belarus or Berlusconi’s flagrant Italian media 
monopoly – attract attention. 
The consequences of this complacency varied across Europe. In Western Europe, it resulted in a 
domestic peace dividend and spurred a major push to transform the European Union politically 
to reflect the new nature and scope of Europe.  The idealistic ambitions and sometime hubris of 
the early-90s EU was quickly dampened by the violence of the Yugoslav wars, including the 
turbulent conflict over Kosovo that lingers to the present.  The lessons that European states, 
especially France and Germany, drew about European weakness and disorganization vis-à-vis a 
dominant United States in Bosnia and Kosovo led to a push for a more serious role for Brussels 
in foreign and defense policy.  Despite a number of objections from national governments and 
many disagreements, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) ultimately provided for a common European 
foreign policy process, though an admittedly watered-down version. 
Germany has posed an especially complex case given both the priority of reunification and its 
oft-exhausting claims on German financial and political means for the last decade.  Germany's 
stalwart sponsorship of cooperative security tools and principles has continued unabated; 
German politicians (particularly Foreign Ministers Joshua Fischer, Frank-Walther Steinmeier, 
and Guido Westerwelle) have regularly praised the contribution cooperative security trends and 
transparency made to their unification.  They called for making these advantages known and 
available to others inside and outside Europe.   
The situation in what we now call Central Europe was, and is, somewhat less complacent and 
certain, given lingering fears and fresh doubts at the beginning of this century about Russia’s 
intentions and its continuing ambitions to act as suzerain CEE states (that is, controlling their 




still see cooperative security as a useful framework, particularly in tandem with the Western 
collective defense guarantees inherent in EU and NATO membership. 
Russia is the clearest exception to particular aspects, but not all, of this pattern of regional order.  
As is discussed in more detail below, Russia under Putin was seen in Western Europe (and in 
Russia) as more predictable and effective than the corrupt and chaotic Yeltsin era. Medvedev’s 
Russia has seemed in much the same pattern but also somewhat softer in outline, more moderate 
in tone, and perhaps more committed to compromise.  The short 2008 Russia-Georgia war raised 
evocative specters of the past with innovative techniques of deception and cyber-attack added to 
old-fashioned guerrilla and conventional force attacks.  For most of Western Europe, at least, the 
conflict, however regrettable, was not cause for concerted disavowal of Russia as a diplomatic 
partner or its exclusion from functional cooperation.26  To them, Russia is far away, energy rich, 
and no longer expansionist in the sense of practicing major overt cross-border aggression.27  
Putin’s election to another possible 12-year term in 2012 seemed at least for four or five weeks 
to stir concern only at home and in Russia’s immediate neighborhood. 
The second factor is the occasional failure of institutions and the foregoing of regular injections 
of cooperation and transparency to change new nationalist behavior or “personalist” or 
“authoritarian-ist” political strategies.  The rapid emergence of new problems on the 
international stage, from the ethno-nationalist disintegration of the former Yugoslavia 
through the emergence of rogue states and non-state terrorism as major global issues, has created 
an uncertain environment and delayed or deadened the development of new institutions.  The 
NATO-Russia Council has faltered in several incarnations.  NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
program has succeeded almost too well in preparing new candidacies for membership and 
implementing meaningful security associations for countries that will never be members.  But 
this is largely because of constant American interest throughout the 1990s and strong bilateral 
underpinnings from several other countries/regions, including Britain, Scandinavia, Poland, and 
the Baltics.  Russia has never really formally participated. 
Instead, cooperation- and confidence-building measures and transparency promotion have 
been left to multilateral institutions already in place – the UN, NATO, OSCE, the EU, and 
perhaps the worst performer of all, the Council of Europe.  Almost all of these institutions failed 
in one or another crucial arena in the late 20th and early 21st centuries; certainly none lived up to 
the easy dreams of a thickening safety net of international and regional security institutions that 
                                                            
26  See for examples two strong documents  from the summer of 2009 in the wake of the  August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict, 
protesting Obama’s policy as too Russia-centric and expressing directly the fear that their interests would be sacrificed to the 
good of better US-Russian relations. The first is a Policy Brief of the German Marshall Fund entitled ‘Why the Obama 
Administration should not Take Central and Eastern Europe for Granted’ signed by Pavol Demes, Istvan Gyarmati, Ivan 
Krasteve, Kadri Liik, Adam Rotfeld , and Alexandr Vondars, of July 13, 2009; the second, an Open Letter issued on 16 July 
2009 by the  Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament. 
27  The 2008 experience in Georgia is seen by many – more in the US than in Europe – as an exception to this judgment. But the 
legal confusion and mutual provocation that is documented in the 2009 EU report allows most to declare guilt on all sides and 
the exception that will never occur again. Its ways at home, while not welcomed, are accepted and not the subject of 
challenge or demands for exclusion as, for example, over Russian action in South Ossetia. Independent International Fact-





were talked about after 1989.  Transparency alone did not guarantee follow-up; information 
about risks did not bring automatic actions or responses.  Success came, if it came at all, through 
unilateral actions or ad-hoc arrangements – “coalitions of the willing” – rather than united 
alliance action in Bosnia and Kosovo.  For example, the United States brokered the development 
of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), without institutionalization and only bilateral 
agreements on political and military assistance.  The problems of establishing and 
ensuring accountability that cooperative security principles require were too often left unresolved 
as a crisis closed.  Transparency promotion policies also floundered, on a scarcity of applicable 
technology throughout CEE or the lack of financial resources nationally and locally to analyze 
and distribute information captured in a timely and effective manner. 
A third factor is what seems to be a new pattern of conflict.  Emerging global threats appeared to 
some (especially in the early Bush years) to be less amenable to attempts at cooperative 
engagement.  Terrorism, jihad, and insurgent warfare proved hard to frame, let alone resolve, in 
terms of cooperative security principles.  Attacks were localized; Iraq and Afghanistan both 
suggested that deterrence in terms of existing theater capabilities was inadequate at best and 
mostly irrelevant unless applied in a specific location or region within a definite time period.  
Moreover, both problems involved a step-change in focus.  While during the Cold War, and for a 
brief period thereafter, the important players were clearly defined and, on issues such as arms 
control, had similar policy objectives, in the early 2000s, it was harder to conceive of a pattern in 
which new threats could and would be managed on a consistent basis.  During the Cold War, 
even conflicts in remote parts of the world were influenced by the actions of one or both of the 
superpowers, and negotiation between the two had the possibility to calm the situation (though, 
obviously, this possibility was not always acted upon). 
The fourth factor, and probably the most critical, was the precipitous change in American policy.  
The Clinton administration embraced the theme of cooperative security, and pursued it officially 
for much of its time in office.  Its successes, though, came mainly in the security and arms 
control area, and in nuclear threat reduction ventures.  Successes did not come from the broader 
efforts of, for instance, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission efforts to engage economic and 
technical elites, or the efforts to engage Russia in global trade agreements or financial 
institutions.  Moreover, the Clinton administration’s inability to act cooperatively with its 
European allies in at least the first years of the Bosnian War marked a true failure in its approach 
to post-Cold War security creation, and helped prolong both the war’s duration and the eventual 
sacrifice of more than 100,000 citizens of the former Yugoslavia.28, 29 
Much of the blame lies with the Bush administration and its revisionist approach to most aspects 
of foreign policy (in the phrase of the times, ABC – “Anything But Clinton”).  It favored 
unilateral action or “coalitions of the willing” over cooperative engagement for its response to 
                                                            
28   Kelleher, 1995; op. cit. pp 117-123.  Originally assessed during the Bosnian conflict, at 200,000 plus, postwar evaluation 
suggests a lower number – still horrific for many in a state acknowledged to be part of postwar  Europe – of 100,000+ for the 
dead and disappeared. Woodward, Susan, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Brookings; 
Washington, D.C., 1995); and Andreas, Peter and Kelly Greenhill (eds.), Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of 
Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict (Cornell, 2010). 




9/11 and its most critical military challenges, in Iraq and Afghanistan.  A wide-ranging 
cooperative framework, particularly one anchored in multilateral treaties and agreements, was 
incompatible with the administration’s preferences and prejudices.  The administration’s 
rejection of the traditional arms control agenda – its withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile 
(ABM) treaty, its unwillingness to proceed with ratification of the comprehensive nuclear test 
ban treaty (CTBT), and its unwillingness to address troubles with either the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) regime in North Korea and Iran or with the CFE treaty in Europe – identified it as 
anti-cooperation in the area with the greatest previous track record in cooperative security policy 
making.  
Bush’s rhetoric, however, still embraced cooperation and strategic partnership, which included 
the close personal presidential ties and the convergence of Russian and American interests in 
issues that ranged from how to deal with the “Axis of Evil” to how to stabilize terms of 
investment and energy supplies.  These factors alone, in Bush’s public argument, reflected the 
end of Cold War hostility and drastically reduced the need for treaties and formal agreements, for 
extensive strategic reduction trade-off formulas, or elaborate protocols for inspections and 
verification.  Cooperation was established and natural; Reagan’s “trust but verify” became “trust 
and ignore”: negotiate and ally only if you cannot proceed single-handed.  Beyond its nuclear 
weapons, Russia, in the view of some neo-conservative members of the Bush administration, was 
simply no longer relevant to the new American strategic and political preeminence.  Just like 
traditional European allies, Russia in the end had no other choice but to deal with the United 
States on its own terms and within the framework of the American global agenda. 
Bush’s approach to Europe in particular was characterized by inattention and indifference, 
overlaid by insistence on short-term political concerns.  The OSCE was perhaps subject to the 
greatest indifference; the Bush team shared and intensified the general disdain of the Clinton 
era (and perhaps before) for this “talking shop,” while Russia’s willingness to manipulate its 
consensus-driven protocols seemingly confirmed their prejudices.  Perhaps the administration’s 
only interest in the OSCE was its election supervision activities, which supported the 
administration’s enthusiasm for democracy promotion.  A number of the bigger European states, 
however, gladly stepped into Bush’s shadow, happy to blame him for what was really their own 
growing indifference and inattention.  It was thus left to the smaller states and the neutrals to 
carry the OSCE ball forward where and when they could. 
In terms of treaties, Bush’s ideological repudiation of formal agreements and multilateralism 
meant CFE and other formal treaties fared only slightly better.  Cooperative security on a day-to-
day level was left to a small but interconnected group of specialists and experts in the foreign 
and defense bureaucracies of each member state.  And its very “usualness” and “standard 
operating procedure” character led both to wide-ranging acceptance and a significant measure of 
protection for the relatively unique transparency and rigor involved.  
The new institutionalization that did receive the Bush imprimatur was almost without exception 
organized efforts that involved Europe as part of a global effort (e.g. against terrorists or further 
proliferation) and as a regional grouping or pole attached to an American central focus.  These 
usually operated in parallel with strong bilateral pressures, rather than through a multilateral 




initiatives were launched without much consultation in Europe or notice to the cooperative 
security organizations that had been central in the 1990s.  For example, the United States began 
developing a missile defense scheme in CEE, first launched as the “third-site project” in 2001-
2002 (discussed further below).  Even more notable were post-9/11 activities that invoked 
cooperative security principles to move American security borders as far offshore as possible, 
including the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the 2002 Container Security 
Initiative, and the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction.  
Bush’s approach left no shortage of problems for President Obama to confront.  The present 
administration’s “reset” with Russia has received the greatest public emphasis in the security 
field, and Obama has crafted policies specific to Europe like the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) missile defense plan.  Until his 2011 demand that Europeans shoulder the 
major roles in the Libyan war, though, his principal hallmarks had been a commitment to listen 
and to abandon “megaphone diplomacy.”  Terrorism and instability that may lead to war remain 
the primary security concerns for publics and politicians throughout Eurasia.30  Iran’s nuclear 
program remains unresolved.  North Korea’s status veers between obstinacy and engagement, 
and an opaque leadership transition in the wake of Kim Jong Il’s death further heightens 
uncertainty on the Korean peninsula.  Stability levels in Afghanistan remain uncertain in the face 
of the withdrawal deadline, Iraq is ended for the West, but turbulence and intra-societal conflict 
remain.  European states have largely gained a greater interest and stake in trying to work with 
the United States, to contain and correct it but also to support its goals and its leadership.  For 
much of the Medvedev period, Russia’s propensity to continuous confrontation and only 
transactional foreign policy abated, and its rhetoric about cooperation increased.  Tensions 
persist, however, and Russia continues to publicly criticize American missile defense plans.  
Furthermore, Russian state television recently accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and 
American Ambassador Michael McFaul of fomenting anti-government sentiments.  The future of 
a new Putin Administration is far from certain.  As will be shown below, each of the challenges 
outlined in this section opens the potential to be addressed using cooperative security approaches 
and techniques.  
 
The Continued Relevance of Cooperative Security  
The rediscovery of cooperative security in Europe has come and will continue to come from 
achieving demonstrable progress on the issues and situations of risk to which it is applied.  
Positive gains are perhaps most easily demonstrated in the areas of security and arms control; the 
risks involved are still more clear-cut than in other areas, even though the threat of nuclear war 
now seems unthinkable in Europe, and plausible scenarios have to be handcrafted for many of 
the other areas of the world.  The fundamental intellectual roots, particularly of arms control, are 
similar; the stress is on creating stability and dialogue and achieving progressive limitation and 
the openness needed to sustain it. 
                                                            





As will be discussed at the end of this essay, far-reaching cooperative security arrangements 
outside of Europe may indeed have to await more aligned fundamental values.  Indeed, 
cooperative security has attracted interest from many regions – most notably from those seeking 
to design a strategy in the Pacific or for the two Koreas.  Those most attached to a “pure” form of 
cooperative security organization (=collective security) would argue that the experiences of both 
the United Nations and the League of Nations, and maybe even the present OSCE, suggest that 
success requires fundamental political consensus on values.31  Most critics ascribe this to the 
overhang effects of expectations and experiences of democratic practice on the national level.  
Some non-democracies can and do provide fringe functionalities, but if its core membership has 
values at odds with each other, an over-arching system that relies on extensive regulation, case-
by-case negotiation about state interests, and collective punishment will almost certainly fail to 
take consistent action or to develop, precedent by precedent, to a new level of habit and 
expectations.32 
But again, such thinking veers toward the ideal of an overarching supranational or regional 
structure that is far beyond what European cooperative security has reached for or ever tried to 
achieve.  So long as the arrangements are built on the cornerstone of national interest and 
sovereignty, there are limits at every stage, no matter what the level of mutual risk or action.  
One further question should be asked as a limit: Are the principal questions about cooperative 
security in Europe really questions that turn on the role of Russia and its engagement in the 
cooperative consensus?  Is it the case that the relative balance of power is the bounding case?  
Moreover, is this a question of selective Russian engagement or the selective application of the 
cooperative security approach in arms control but not on questions of out-of-area proliferation?  
And is this only a question of time and practice, rather than inherent structural negatives?  Is it a 
close parallel to the Monnet thesis of peaceful integration in Europe with progressively widening 
circles of cooperation and transparency based on habits and a pattern of success? 
To take the extreme view: If one accepts Richard Cohen’s formula, the answers to these 
questions are fairly simple. NATO is the only operational cooperative security organization and 
Russia, obviously, is not a member.  Nor, if present evidence is correct, will it ever be.  The same 
is true for a Russian membership in the European Union. Cohen’s requirement of shared values 
makes total Russian involvement in a Western/Atlantic cooperative security arrangement 
doubtful.  It is easier, although only marginally so, to imagine some day that Ukraine or Georgia 
might come to be accepted as members.  It is also far from clear why and at what cost Russia 
would want to join such an organization, particularly one with broad objectives.  
But the definition of cooperative security that we have developed here suggests Cohen has 
missed the essential element.  Russia does have risk-reduction interests in common with the 
West in core policy areas.  It can be a productive and helpful partner on many issues and can 
move from being a target to a co-decider of many policies of the Western cooperative security 
apparatus.  Ukraine and Georgia in the end present many risks but fewer fundamental challenges, 
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and have thus far less to contribute to the mutual goal of regional and global security.  
Cooperation with Russia may well cost far more, but the ultimate gains and therefore the 
ultimate cost/benefit calculation over the long haul for both sides is significantly different than 
with lesser states.  Both Russia and the United States need a core of mutual political will that can 
generate the confidence and commitment to transparency that is required; that can assess the 
benefit/cost ratio in respecting the red-line security concerns of the other and that impels 
domestic political leaderships to make all this a critical national priority. 
This essay argues that in Europe and elsewhere there is still much to which the concept and 
expanded tool kit of cooperative security can be applied.  The concept and practice arose in times 
when risk of war was low but calculable and when Russia’s cooperation was not assured but 
deemed possible.  The situation at present suggests a far lower risk of direct military threat but 
many other risks confronting individual and state security in the long run.  There is a need for 
new initiatives and for defending and expanding the practices of the past and the present against 
today’s challenges and future threats.  Without this type of commitment, the level of 
transparency, trust, and engagement that have sustained peace and its credibility within the 
European space will fade.  This paper will return to these conundrums, with recommendations 
for future cooperative solutions, in each of the below test cases.  
 
III. Core Factors in Cooperative Security  
As was outlined in my 1995 analysis, and has been reprised above, the implementation of the 
concept of cooperative security essentially turns on states’ persistent willingness to use means 
short of violence to achieve stable and peaceful arrangements that prevent surprise attack and 
may allow dispute resolution with other states deemed hostile or core competitors.  It does not 
guarantee that war will not occur, but it provides for a dampening of risk, a lowering of constant 
tension, and means to signal defensive, not offensive intent.  In John Steinbruner’s words about 
cooperative security in the strategic nuclear realm: “Each side would cede the legitimacy of 
territorial defense and would cooperate to impose restraint on offensive operations.”33  
As I have detailed above, the European model of cooperative security entails a broad range of 
variables.  It implies that success depends on a variety of external factors: economic prosperity, 
the availability of leadership talent, and, probably, the diminution and ultimately the lowering of 
the possibility of overwhelming threat.34  But its manifestations in Europe are also conditioned by 
three important core variables:  
                                                            
33 John D. Steinbruner, “Cooperative Security,” International Encyclopedia of Political Science, October 2010. Available at 
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=535.  




1. The role of the United States as both promoter and anchor, with a domestic consensus 
that has allowed for the recognition of both European and Russian security concerns and 
for a commitment to defend against attack but not to take aggressive action;  
2. The pattern of institutional relations, especially in and for Europe itself, that gave 
multilateral institutions the capability to clarify security concerns, to legitimize a search 
for resolutions short of war, and to foster cooperative processes and tools; and  
3. The role of Russia as actively engaged in European security, in terms of what it demands 
as reassurance of its own perception of threat and risk, and its willingness to understand 
and acknowledge European and American perceptions.  
The “Indispensable Nation”: The United States and Cooperative Security35  
A core element in all cooperative security efforts of the 20th and 21st century has been American 
support and leadership under successive Democratic and Republican administrations.  The 
cooperative path from 1991 to 2010 of the European zone of peace, however, has not always 
been smooth or assessed in the same way by all participants.  It is important to sketch the present 
state of the relationship and the expectations on all sides about the sources of agreement and 
disagreement in the future. 
1. American Perspectives  
At the highest levels, official American attitudes toward transatlantic cooperation and 
cooperation with Russia shifted to a narrow focus directly after the emotional debates that led up 
to the Iraq War in 2002-2003.  President Bush cast the world as “either with us or against us.”36  
This proved to be a considerable test for the “oldest allies” in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, with the elites and publics viewing Bush as a rogue warrior determined to 
implement his own strategy, preferably unilaterally, and only making a sop to the international 
community as a disingenuous act of legitimacy seeking.  Most leaders, but tellingly, not the 
publics, of newly admitted NATO members in CEE sided with the Bush administration.  They 
found themselves being treated on a par with their Western European neighbors, and still in thrall 
to the United States, which had helped liberate them at the end of the Cold War.  This was 
NATO’s collective defense as they understood it, the reason why NATO membership whatever 
its costs was to be prized, and the American guarantee of their integrity and security was to be 
their principal bulwark against renewed Russian pressure or aggression.   
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36 For an earlier analysis of this see Kelleher, Catherine, “The United States and Europe: Waiting to Exhale” in Tardy, Thierry 




Russia was among the major states, along with Germany and France, which rejected the Bush 
lead on Iraq, both publicly and privately.  The Bush administration’s rhetoric toward Russia 
remained that of strategic partnership, with the noted decline of a need for agreements, 
verification, or even explanations for actions among two states that were as committed to 
cooperation and the same basic values.  But within the U.S. bureaucracy and within some sectors 
of the American public, Russia somewhat resumed the status it had had during the latter stages of 
the Cold War—a state of potential, if not actual, hostility to the United States, concerned only 
with its imperialist dreams and its nationalist ambitions. 
During his second term, President Bush pursued a more conciliatory tone.  The administration 
gave more rhetorical emphasis to European concerns about preserving stability, to diplomatic 
solutions, and to encouraging wide-ranging definitions of cooperative security – still 
concentrating on the global war on terror, but taking a more international approach to energy 
security and seeking a multi-partner “Road Map” in the Middle East.  As time passed, Western 
European allies who had opposed U.S. action in Iraq rediscovered the commercial and political 
common ground they had previously shared.  The first European Security Strategy of 2003 
perhaps represented the most dramatic turning point: the deliberate crafting (through the 
blessings of Javier Solana and the major European powers) of a document designed to come as 
close to the Bush doctrine and concepts of security requirements as Europe could.37  Furthermore, 
the election of center-right leaders in Germany and France, Angela Merkel in 2005 and Nicolas 
Sarkozy in 2007, while still not traditional pro-American leaders, marked a clear transition from 
the stridently anti-American rhetoric of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques 
Chirac. 
Russia represented a different case.  As is discussed below, President Putin reportedly 
determined that Bush’s rhetoric would never result in a true strategic partnership, and that Bush 
would never grant legitimacy to Russian fears of exclusion from decisions – such as those 
regarding missile defense – made unilaterally or within NATO.  Instead, he turned at least some 
of his focus toward cooperation with the major European states, especially with Germany and 
France.  Interviews done in Moscow and Washington between 2004 and 2005 revealed enormous 
frustration and wells of hostility on both sides.  The culminating event for Bush was the 
extremely pointed February 2007 speech that Putin gave at the Munich Security Conference (aka 
Wehrkunde), in which he accused the United States essentially of imperial ambition and only 
aggressive intent in Iraq and Afghanistan.38  Bush officials saw the Putin strategy as combative 
on the critical basics of nonproliferation and arms control, and raising persistent resistance and 
sometimes-organized opposition to major U.S. diplomatic moves across spheres and regions.  
The ultimate denouement came with the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war, where Russia acted 
militarily against a Partnership-for-Peace state that Bush had declared was destined shortly for 
NATO membership.  It also was what a number in Moscow saw as a “tit for tat” retribution for 
the West’s unwillingness to consider Russian opposition to NATO actions against Kosovo.  The 
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result was a suspension of all but the most needed exchanges, and a shutdown of all on-going 
negotiations. 
But poll data discussed below also suggests that, for most Americans, the calculus that has 
sustained a relatively unique transatlantic framework still holds. Americans still tend – albeit in 
somewhat smaller numbers now – to see Europeans as “like us.”  They expect Europeans, 
regardless of whether there is any confirming evidence, to have the same values, to see and 
assess the emerging threats the same way, and to be spurred by the same convictions to promote 
democracy and a just international order.  Europeans are the most intertwined and trusted allies, 
even the often-maligned French, and Americans expect them to cooperate and to “be there with 
us.”39  Elite opinion has less sentimental parallels.  Particularly after the last decade, American 
elites are far from confident that the United States alone can or should bear the burdens of global 
leadership.  Europeans have assumed significant political responsibilities, some of which are not 
easily accessible to Washington – such as the European Three’s early negotiations with Iran over 
Iranian enrichment facilities and the coordinated, multi-year drive to persuade Libya to give up 
its long-hidden nuclear capabilities.  Under the 1992 Petersburg agreements and the security-task 
definitions set forth in the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, Europe has codified, and 
increasingly acted upon, specific security and foreign policy priorities.40  
The most recent test was European action in Libya, an action that was stimulated by French and 
British calls for NATO action in support of the opposition to the Gaddafi regime.  Obama 
stepped back from the lead in this conflict on the grounds that the United States was not prepared 
to engage in another prolonged conflict (the U.S. military’s greatest fear) and because the 
conflict was in Europe’s neighborhood and therefore Europe’s responsibility.  In many respects, 
Obama’s initial assertions did not match later operational reality.  Europe’s performance was 
somewhat ragged; Europe repeatedly confronted its lack of basic investment in munitions and 
equipment for more than a decade.41  American support for surveillance, logistics, and 
communications was key, and provided not simply through formal NATO channels.  
EU forces have also assumed a number of low-end political-military tasks, notably in Africa (see 
Appendix 3 for a list of EU security missions), which Americans have tended to see as far less 
extraordinary than have Europeans.  Americans generally accept this type of engagement as the 
responsibility of “those that can” to do the “right” thing.  U.S. officials also suggested that the 
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EU tasks were neither terribly difficult nor the types of missions in which the United States 
would have participated. 
The election of Barack Obama proved to be a critical change.  Although the positive effects of 
the Obama factor have diminished over the months, there is no doubting Europe’s basic trust and 
admiration for the president.  The decision to award the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize to Obama 
shortly into his first term partially reflected these sentiments.  Indeed, the administration’s 
approval ratings were higher in France, Germany, and the UK than they were in the more divided 
United States.  A June 2010 poll conducted by The German Marshall Fund of the United States 
found that 71 percent of respondents in the European Union and Turkey supported President 
Obama’s handing of international affairs, a drastic increase over the 19 percent that supported 
Bush’s international policies in 2008.42  This was even higher than Obama’s 57 percent domestic 
approval rating.  Obama’s popularity transcended his personal actions and personality; a majority 
of EU citizens and Turks (66 percent) had a favorable opinion of the United States overall (a 
significant increase from the Bush years).  The number of Europeans that believed “it is desirable 
that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs” also increased from 33 percent in 
2008 to 50 percent in 2009.  
The picture of Obama’s irreproachability is not universal, however, even among the nations 
surveyed; changed political circumstances explain some of this variation.  For instance, many 
new East European NATO members saw Obama’s actions vis-à-vis Russia – forgiving the 
disproportionate Russian counterattack in Georgia in 2008, containing critiques of the alleged 
Russian cyber attacks on Lithuania and Estonia, and tolerating Russia’s reported fomenting of 
ethnic violence in Estonia in 2007-2008 – as disappointing and weak.  Obama’s restructuring of 
Bush plans to deploy missile defense interceptors to Poland and radars to the Czech Republic, 
only exacerbated CEE worries about Obama’s naïveté regarding Russian policies.  But some 
CEE politicians argue that the United States cares more about agreement on stability and arms 
control with Russia than it does about the rights of its allies.  Obama’s resolute support for 
EPAA, with the expansion to Romanian, Spanish, and Turkish bases in the face of growing 
Russian disapproval has softened many of these criticisms.  Turkey’s public is also divided over 
Obama, with increasing skepticism or outright disapproval. 
Russia’s situation is once again divergent.  Initially, Obama invested heavily in a “reset” of U.S.-
Russian relations in a number of areas, and has concluded critical agreements that undergird 
strategic stability, spelling out mutual dependence on efforts in Afghanistan and pursuing 
strategic arms control.  Negotiations continued to move forward in a number of critical areas –
including missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear weapons reductions, the conclusion of a CTBT, 
Iran’s nuclear program, and the entry of Russia into the WTO.  The number of high-level visits 
and meetings increased manifold; the number of conversations with both President Medvedev 
and Prime Minister Putin more than doubled the later Bush years.43  But major areas of 
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disagreement remain and an atmosphere of almost-stalemate is emerging – over NATO’s action 
in Libya, diplomacy in response to the Arab Spring and Syria in particular, and the question of 
the U.S. precise conventional strike capability, to name only the most painful.  Putin’s return 
looms large among the future uncertainties being assessed in Washington and in allied capitals.  
Russian opposition to EPAA and continuing resentment over NATO expansion, Kosovo, and 
Libya seem implacable. 
The Russian public is far more positive about America than it was in the Bush years. Obama’s 
presidency is a factor; so too is the greater governmental openness that is reflected in Russia’s 
state-controlled television, the principal source of news for 80 percent of the population.44  In 
general, the population is more confident and more willing to consider cooperation with the U.S. 
and by extension NATO.  The only negative trends relate to economic policy and economic 
performance, and the perception that Russia is weak and being taken advantage of by the West.  
These trends are particularly strong among older generations and Putin supporters, and among 
those who support the old Communist party.  Urban and rural populations contrast strongly in 
their perceptions and expectations of the West with younger urbanites and those middle-class 
professionals who benefited most from Putin’s strong hand and flexible economic policies.  
Institutionalization in the Transatlantic Space  
1.  The Atlantic Bond – NATO and the EU  
NATO is without question now the preeminent security organization in the West, and it has been 
adapting to the new 21st century circumstances.  NATO’s engagements in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and most recently Libya have brought new insights into the nature of the alliance, 
while also being predominantly American-derived creations.  These first ventures into “the 
alliance at war” have also demonstrated a strong sense of the alliance’s limitations.  As then 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pungently observed in his farewell speech to the alliance, 
NATO now appears too often to be a divided organization, with partners unwilling or unable to 
meet their commitments, with deeply held differences about the role and scope of NATO’s 
agenda for the 21st century.45  Some Europeans have echoed these fears.  UK Defense Minister 
Philip Hammond warned that Europe needs to prove that it is “serious about defense” during a 
2012 speech. NATO’s expansion to 28 members, to include former Warsaw Pact countries and 
former Soviet Republics of the Baltic area, has ultimately led to questions about the composition 
of the ideal membership as well as about the alliance’s appropriate activities.  Ultimately, NATO 
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must deal with its relationship to Russia, which is never to be a member but always an irritant, if 
not more, to some CEE states. 
Most models of NATO’s future stress continued transatlantic consensus on the basis of 
transparency and stability, values and goals that have served the West well, and the habit of 
continuing cooperation to mutual benefit.  The uncertainty has been about what would be the 
appropriate framework for such an alliance and what form of political and military commitments 
would be required.  If one of these alternatives is sufficiently attractive, it might be able to 
replace or enhance the scenarios of NATO or NATO/EU evolution that have characterized 
transatlantic debate since the end of the Cold War.   
Obama, perceived both as a liberal democrat with rhetoric that has promised more 
multilateralism and as a politician with an unprecedented international background, had caused 
Europeans, at least initially, to reassess their opinions of the United States.  As will be discussed 
later, Obama had at a minimum changed the direction of missile defense planning and tailored 
both the system’s concept and its technical descriptions closer to Russian preferences such that it 
was possible to contemplate Russian involvement and cooperation.  His move thus pleased 
Western European missile defense opponents and soothed CEE opponents. 
But Obama’s specific agenda for NATO, beyond the broad goals of anti-terrorism and solidarity 
in Afghanistan, is at this point in his administration far from universally acclaimed.  The 
administration’s view of Europe may be less sentimental than any previous administration.46 
European leaders have rarely been as closely aligned with the U.S. president on matters of social 
policy, but in foreign policy, Europe lags in importance compared to its paramount position for 
most predecessors.  Analysts have argued that both the president’s personal heritage and his 
assessment of likely important international issues mean that often-parochial European concerns 
rank behind other problems.47  China is now seen as America’s most significant strategic 
competitor and partner.48  Europe has led the campaign for a stronger response to climate 
change, but it is the likes of China and India that are crucial to the development of a solution.  
First Iraq and now Afghanistan are winding down as the central conflicts; European countries are 
withdrawing their troops at an even faster pace than the United States.  Libya, both for critics and 
supporters, seemed to herald a different sharing of NATO’s burdens as did the President’s 
designation of Europe as having become a “net exporter of security.”49  
Obama’s 2012 announcement of a new defense strategy and of the withdrawal of approximately 
50% of the U.S. troops in Europe met with little surprise or resistance on either side of the 
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Atlantic, somewhat disappointing Atlanticists. Europe is now designated an “economy of force 
area.”50  Asia and the Middle East are to be the United States’s main focus. Allied partnerships 
are therefore deemed increasingly important. Nuclear worries in North Korea and Iran, and the 
endless Israel-Palestine problem also offer supporting roles for European involvement.  This 
relegation may in part reflect a complacency on the part of the administration – that Europe is 
stable, on “our side,” and unlikely to vanish any time soon.  But it does reflect a shift in U.S. 
priorities from a Cold War-centric view of the world, to an attempt to seriously explore what the 
increasingly Asia-centric economic as well as military future will look like and shaping its 
thinking accordingly. 
Viewed in the context of the shooting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the midst of 
squabbles over rights and obligations, all but a linear extension of the present NATO format 
seems somewhat academic or farfetched.  However, it is instructive to look at how different yet 
convergent American and European discussions of possible alternatives to NATO have been.  
An ever-larger group of Americans also questions whether formal multilateral frameworks based 
on consensus pose particular problems for a dominant political and military power that believes 
in its global reach and its own exceptionalism.51  Organizational procedures are slow, consensus 
building is often hard and imperfect, and political constraints lead at best to lowest-common 
denominator decisions when the asymmetries of power and interest are not taken into account.  
This was a favorite theme of some in the Bush Administration (particularly regarding formal 
treaties and the divisive debate over Iraq), but it is hardly a new theme in American foreign 
policy, especially in the twentieth century (e.g., see the Senate debate about the League of 
Nations in 1918-1919).  
For Americans and many Europeans, the operational significance of asymmetries in power 
registered forcefully first in Kosovo and then in the Second Gulf War.  Before the decisions to 
invade Iraq in 2003, some conservative American critics went a step further and argued that the 
United States would be better off fighting alone given the “unbridgeable” gap in transatlantic 
military capabilities.52  Europeans, with the possible exception of the British, the French, and 
maybe the Germans, were simply too far behind to catch up. They could at best attain “niche” 
capabilities, with traditional ideas of transatlantic burden sharing having not survived even a 
neighborhood test in the Balkans.  Many Europeans read Kosovo differently (i.e. as an inability 
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to affect the outcome or even the course of action given their weakness and lack of national or 
European capability).  Some vowed privately never to let that happen again, whether through the 
development of a European autonomous capability or through exploring options for a “soft 
balancing” of the United States and its tendency toward unilateral decisions.  The Libyan 
operations and continued reductions in European forces and stocks suggest that determination 
was short-lived. 
In the American image of the preferred international order, Europe will continue to be a zone of 
peace and prosperity and a net exporter of security.  Yet Europe is presently challenged by 
several internal security issues, beyond its involvement in North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Kosovo.  As will be discussed in section IV, Europe’s energy vulnerability looms ever larger; the 
need, especially for the smaller and CEE states, for guaranteed supplies and relatively equitable 
access to resources remains a pressure point for Russia’s oil diplomacy.  Beyond the 
unpredictable terrorist or jihadist threats linger potential hot spots, such as Ukraine, Georgia, 
Belarus, the Caucasus, and the several “frozen conflicts” along Russia’s southern periphery.  The 
Hungarian experience in 2012 suggests that authoritarianism still exists and may descend into 
anti-democratic governance in the face of economic downturn.53  Europe also has to deal with 
the complex security status of Turkey and its potential ambitions for dominance vis-à-vis the 
northern Middle East in general and the Iraqi Kurds in particular.  Europe, Americans conclude, 
must come to understand Europe’s new security needs and its obligations to the global order, but 
more importantly its obligations to the maintenance of the present democratic systems and 
peaceful borders.  
2. European Perspectives: No Single Voice 
Few of the smaller or emerging democracies in “New Europe” are interested in, or willing to 
support, a global framework for cooperative security or partnership; their sights are set at most at 
the European regional level.  Even North Africa or the Middle East seem to pose only far away 
threats, of little relevance to them.  The dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces is debatable and 
must include provisions for their speedy withdrawal if conflict or acute threat looms.  Military 
deaths for those who contributed to the U.S. coalition in Iraq or are now represented in ISAF in 
Afghanistan have been a new experience for the CEE domestic political scene, which was 
shielded from such tragedies during the Soviet era and the initial post-Cold War decade.  Few 
CEE leaders are ready to contemplate another contribution, even on a small scale, in the 
foreseeable future.  Opposition critics indeed now challenge the price/benefit ratio involved: Was 
the cost of this out-of-region support for the United States actually appreciated or compensated?  
How have alliance membership and the resulting obligations actually benefited national security 
in recent years?  And reflecting the lower popularity ratings described earlier, did not the United 
States now have more interest in carving out a new cooperative agenda with Russia than in 
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honoring the debts and promises of the Bush Administration on, for instance, missile defense or 
investment plans or defense against Russian energy pressures?  
In this broad context, Britain, France, and increasingly Italy and Germany, present a more 
engaged security agenda, up to and including the use of military force as a last resort.  These 
states have a broader, more global scope, and have been engaged in, and have often lead, phases 
of the fight against terrorism and efforts to limit proliferation.  Yet, even for these states, states 
with major international economic and energy stakes, priority goes to the domestic economy and 
national security interests, and to European regional interests, expressed within future EU 
security competencies.  The institutional battles between NATO and the EU seem largely over, 
and cooperative arrangements are firmly in place, even if in specific cases, such as the 
competition over the Darfur support force aimed at assisting the beleaguered African Union 
forces, the hand-over protocols or the specific divisions of labor are not to everyone’s liking.  In 
contrast, the concept of linked cooperative security partnerships or a coalition of democracies 
with commitments to humanitarian intervention that is outside of the UN framework has limited 
attraction and generated outright opposition at the NATO Riga Summit in 2006 and the NATO 
debates before the Bucharest summit in 2008.  These doubts have delayed the development of 
earlier concepts, and the Obama team is now not interested enough to spend the political capital 
necessary to resurrect them. 
Two contrasting fears plague most centrist European elites, the leaders of both new and old 
Europe.  First, the experience of the post-Cold War era suggests that it is difficult to avoid 
sharing the risk of American use of military power, even at a geographical and psychological 
distance.  Despite recent cuts, American forces are still deployed and launched from Europe, and 
American tactical nuclear weapons are still in Europe, albeit in very small numbers.  (The NATO 
Strategic Concept of 2010 and the subsequent 2011-2012 Defense and Disarmament Review – 
see discussion below – may once again leave them in doctrinal limbo despite popular and elite 
opposition to what seems an obsolete force.)  European sites under broad, bilateral agreements 
with the United States are still used for intelligence, for planning, and, as the worst of the Iraq 
practices showed, for extraordinary rendition and secret detention.   
Short of a politically costly show of opposition, as undertaken by Germany, France, and Turkey 
over Iraq in 2003, most European members of NATO retain their guaranteed right of 
consultation and voice in decision-making.  And as an organizational framework, NATO has 
been a major instrument for establishing and maintaining a relatively unique degree of 
transparency about military forces, military plans, and military deficiencies among its 28 
members (e.g. through the annual national NATO reviews).  The United States regularly 
participates and can be collectively, if not always successfully, addressed and held to account in 
a continuing political forum.  
Paradoxically, as the recent debate on European missile defense has proven once again, being 
left out of a decision critical to the security of their populations raises other fears among NATO 
members: that the “rampant unilateralism” of the United States will drag them into a conflict, a 




The sum of these fears is that the search for a new framework or a way to restructure the existing 
framework remains unresolved.  The global networking of NATO or the linking of other 
democracies in the Middle East and Asia to NATO, first espoused by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright and initially favored by Secretary Hilary Clinton’s team, now seems remote 
in any practical political terms or useful only in low-profile specific security tasks (as in the anti-
piracy efforts off Africa’s east coast).54  
Yet, simply clinging to structures and patterns of the past seems equally unlikely.  There is an 
appetite among NATO leaders for cooperation with non-NATO partners like India. U.S. 
Permament Representative to NATO Ivo Daalder highlighted the role of NATO in encouraging 
such cooperation during a 2012 presentation.55  The extent to which these non-NATO countries 
are able or willing to participate in European cooperative security arrangements is unclear. There 
is also an interest in building on extra-NATO mechanisms like the Proliferation Security 
Initiative. 
The Problem with, of, and for Russia  
Almost every discussion on how to structure cooperative security in Europe has started and 
ended in debate over the proper role of Russia in the evolution of European security.  This was 
true even in the annali miracoli at the beginning of the 1990s, when the Soviet threat to Europe 
formally ended and Russia actively pursued a new partnership with the West under Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin.  The strategy of engagement seemed destined to be successful, but habits and 
prejudices on all sides died hard, and policy chasms seemed at every step to cast doubt on the 
ability to reach a lasting level of stability and mutual understanding.  
Is it not the case, Western skeptics about cooperative security have argued, that the principal 
questions about cooperative security in Europe are really questions that turn on the role of Russia 
and its engagement in the cooperative consensus?  Should it not commit to changing its 
international behavior and abandoning its claim to superpower/imperial privilege?  Is it the case 
that the relative balance of power is the true boundary to its conduct?  So long as Russia was 
anxious to be considered as an equal by the United States, it regarded American preferences for 
the cooperative solutions in Europe as at least a primary condition.  The 1990s saw grave 
disappointments and disjunctures; the George W. Bush years, despite the rhetoric of partnership, 
even more.  Once Putin shifted strategy in 2004-2005, to one that built a Russian identity defined 
as non-American or as not dependent on American “approval” or sometimes even in total 
distinction to the United States, Russia had no longer any need to accept “American conditions.”  
The limitations of Russia’s ability to be truly self-sufficient were swiftly found.  But the Putin 
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strategy asserts that there are only limited reasons to define interests cooperatively – and only 
then at times and in places of Russia’s choosing.  
In the United States, criticism of cooperation with Russia has become especially pronounced in 
recent years. Many high-profile right-wing politicians and commentators have attacked the 
“reset” policy, alleging that the Obama administration has sold out Eastern European allies and 
American interests in order to meet Russian demands.  This criticism has extended to plans for 
missile defense cooperation, as well as the New START treaty.  GOP presidential candidate Mitt 
Romney used high profile op-eds attacking the treaty to establish his foreign policy expertise in 
2010 ahead of the 2012 presidential election.56  These right-wing voices often stress the need for 
“equal security” for the CEE states. 
In general, existing institutional frameworks continue to struggle to work with Russia in a 
cooperative security arrangement.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither the West nor 
Russia has identified an appropriate institutional framework that assures regular negotiations, 
bargaining, and the exchange of information beyond bilateral channels.  Russia expected to be 
treated well because of its former superpower status and the way it surrendered its identity, 
territory, and nuclear weapons after 1991.  It was not.  NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the CFE 
regime all placed Russia in the unenviable position of being the one against all the rest, the focus 
or the target of action of the others.  Furthermore, while many states have been willing to 
cooperate with Russia, to trade with it and buy its energy, few have been willing to stand by 
Russia in times of crisis, even given its new wealth and energy resources. Sometimes this has 
been a self-inflicted wound – as in the case of the war in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, when 
members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) remained silent about 
Moscow’s actions or where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)’s final communiqué 
didn’t mention it.   
Obama’s first three years have seen a definite lightening of the political mood and a retreat from 
Russia’s constant sniping about the United States.  In part this reflected the positive turn of the 
arms control negotiations, with President Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov 
asserting that this dialogue was entering a productive phase.  The Russian leadership were 
clearly more surprised by Obama’s election and his avowed willingness to “reset” U.S.-Russian 
relations than were most other European elites; they welcomed his changes to U.S. missile 
defense plans, even while publicly declaring that they would remain a problem in the future. 
Russian hardliners, particularly in the military, still see a looming follow-on threat in U.S. 
conventional strategic superiority and the Obama plan for a series of linked regional missile 
defense schemes, but there was a better fundamental state of relations on which to build and a 
level of cooperation on Afghanistan that can be expanded to support American interests.57  
Russia’s political future is uncertain, especially after Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party 
tampered with the results of the December 2011 parliamentary elections and called forth 
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unexpected country-wide demonstrations, most visibly in Moscow and St Petersburg.  It remains 
to be seen whether the newly reelected Putin will respond to emerging largely middle-class 
demands for a more open society. Some suspect that he will crack down on ongoing protests and 
seek to maintain current authoritarian political structures, and that his use of the “anti-American, 
strong-defense” card in the electoral campaign will in itself create barriers he cannot jump over 
easily.  Others argue that the presidential campaign forced Putin to adopt more overtly 
nationalistic rhetoric and to dismiss continuing U.S.-Russia negotiations on missile defense and 
other issues unless they are on Russian terms. Now secure, they argue, he will have more leeway 
and given Russia’s financial difficulties, will have reason to realign in part with the United States 
and Europe. 
1. Russian Strategic Concerns and the Agenda for Reassurance under Cooperative 
Security 
In the last 20 years, four broad strategic concerns have emerged as accepted “truths” in Russia, 
all with critical bearing on the prospects for cooperative security arrangements with the United 
States and Europe.  What Russia fears is often hidden in a cloud of nationalist rhetoric of 
political opportunism, and a cacophony of voices vying in stridency.  The Soviet tradition of 
hard bargaining to the last deal sets the standard in formal negotiation; the fracture and opacity of 
Moscow political debate means public statements are rare and often-unreliable guides.  But these 
trends have become less common, particularly under Medvedev’s “reset,” and presumably will 
continue declining as “normalization” and “reconciliation” with Russia’s neighbors, especially 
Poland, proceeds.58 
i. Strategic Uncertainty 
Russia is only slowly emerging from two decades of strategic uncertainty—about its own 
identity and its 21st century political and security requirements.  The past two decades have 
mostly been about what Russian leaders have perceived as weakness and retreat—the loss of 
superpower status, the uncertainty of economic adjustment, and the palpable discrepancies of 
wealth distribution.  Measurable increases in Russian quality of life are offset by criticism on the 
left about Putin authoritarianism and on the right about Russia’s unrequited sacrifices to the West 
after 1991.  Naïve or hopeful attitudes that Russia would become a “normal” European country 
were quickly replaced in many circles by a political discourse that, particularly in hard times, 
stresses renewed distrust of the West, and emphasizes the glories of the national past.  The future 
is generally viewed gloomily: What will be the affect of Putin’s return to the presidency?  Will 
energy continue to pay the national way for at least another decade?  Will threats from Russia’s 
South and eventually Russia’s East pose overwhelming challenges to Russia’s largely 
unprepared military forces? 
ii. Nuclear Weapons as Strikers of the Balance 
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Russian nuclear weapons, like their U.S. counterparts, are now at their lowest levels since the 
late 1950s given both unilateral reductions and arms control agreements with the United States.  
The New START agreement will reduce the active stockpiles to a little over 1,500, and perhaps 
less given the retirement of specific weapons systems.  Yet in political and, especially, military 
circles, nuclear weapons’ value to Russia has increased, in both doctrine and operations. 
Strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons alike are the makeweight to what Russians see as 
their conventional inferiority to NATO in the West and potential challengers, including China, in 
the East.  Russia has maintained their weapons’ technical capacity on a more or less equal 
footing with those in the West, and in some cases, the Russian military has argued that without 
political or arms control restraint, their capability could have been superior (particularly 
regarding short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the associated sensors, and present 
radars).  But Russian conventional weapons are not equal in numbers, readiness, or precision to 
American offensive and defensive capabilities.  And shrinking Russian conventional forces are 
likely to continue to lag in mobility, readiness, and command reform, despite major new 
investments. 
This is particularly true in the domain of air/missile defense and enhances the complexity of 
NSNW reduction bargains.  Russia still maintains the Galosh missile defense system around 
Moscow, and it is adding conventional weapons to the older nuclear warheads originally 
developed for the system.  But after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia lost most of its front-line 
air-defense network including forward stations in the Baltic and the Caucasus military districts.  
Many military leaders still view tactical air strikes as part of disarming/decapitating strategies as 
the most likely military threat, nuclear or conventional, from the West.59  Replacing this network 
has been expensive, time-consuming, and it is not yet complete.  In the 1990s, Russia chose not 
to participate in NATO’s Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) to monitor conventional aircraft, 
although it now participates in civil air traffic monitoring through a special arrangement with 
NATO facilitated by EUROCONTROL.60 
iii. The Search for “Equal Sacrifice” 
A persistent theme in popular discourse is Russia’s proclaimed right to “equal sacrifice” in any 
bargains with the United States and the states of “old NATO.”  Russia, the argument goes, 
willingly gave up its empire and withdrew without violence from the CEE states, and in return it 
expected (and, some add, was promised) acceptance and concessions from the West.  The 
inequality of sacrifice is particularly clear in Putin’s 2002 acceptance of Bush’s withdrawal from 
the ABM Treaty without a specific offset and despite the weakness of Russian air defenses.  But 
there are other grievances as well.  Russia’s sense of outrage also focuses often on the “near 
abroad,” where some believe Russia should or must have special droit de regard or decisive 
influence.  Those who make this argument assert, for example, that the now independent FSU 
states – such as the Baltics – have proven “ungrateful” for the sacrifices Russia undertook and 
the economic investment and support Russia made to their present status.  In the 1990s, the 
                                                            
59 See, for example, the statements stressing also the threat of the increased numbers of Western cruise missiles by Major General 
Igor Sheremet, Deputy Head of the General Staff, on 31 May 2011 to Ekho Moskvy radio accessed at 
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-sees-growing-cruise-missile-threat-from-west/ 
60 See for more analysis Anya Loukianova, “Cooperative Airspace Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” Center for International 




unequal treatment of Russian citizens in these states became a nationalist rallying cry; for the 
Russian Right, it continues to be a potent symbol, even after fundamental changes under 
European auspices have been made in status and political participation. 
This demand for equal sacrifice has surfaced repeatedly in arms control negotiations.  Of 
particular importance for any future NSNW reduction agreement are the Russian charges of 
inequity regarding the implementation of the CFE agreement and its protocol.  Here Russian 
diplomats and military officials have complained that the agreement requires sacrifices to be 
made almost exclusively on Russian territory, with unequal coverage of weapons systems, and 
with rights of inspection targeted at the oversight of Russian capabilities and bases, whatever the 
formal practice. 
 
iv. The Need for a New Organizational Framework to Guarantee a Russian Role in Decisions on 
European Security 
A related theme has been Russian insistence on a new organizational framework—beyond 
NATO, OSCE, and any pre-1991 organization—that will secure Russia an appropriate voice in 
European security policy councils.  Russia’s preferred format has varied over time, and there 
have been few specific details beyond a decisive Russian influence. In the argument of a Russian 
interviewee, Russia is “not Estonia” and therefore not just one more “equal” member.  Most 
recently, in 2008 Medvedev called for an overarching new European security framework, a call 
that remained relatively vague and attracted little external interest or support before being 
essentially disowned in 2010 by its creator.61  
Moscow’s ambivalence about its own strategic identity is here most telling.  In many issue areas 
and in many discussion circles, Russia’s standard of comparison is always the United States, and 
the strength/outcome of the bilateral relationship and reciprocal exchanges.  For the foreseeable 
future, this will remain the case. But it also has more than occasionally flirted with its role in the 
European space and its long-term association with the major regional players – Germany above 
all, but also England and France.  It has had an off-and-on relationship with the European Union 
per se, but knows its exclusion from that body is most probably permanent.  And neither the 
OSCE nor the Council of Europe as currently organized carries sufficient weight or influence to 
attract most Russians.  
Russian interest on this issue is now focused on a network of three institutions: the Cooperative 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) made up of FSU republics that are still closely allied with 
Russia; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Russia hopes - against Chinese 
resistance – will still develop a stronger security or regional stability focus; and most importantly 
for European security discussions, the revived and reformatted NATO-Russia Council (NRC).  
NATO’s Lisbon Summit agreement gave new functions and responsibilities to the NRC, 
particularly in forging a cooperative European missile defense scheme, as we will discuss below.  
It is, in my opinion and the views of those I interviewed among Russian and European leaders, 
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also the most promising of the three organizations to assuage Russian concerns.  
 
 
IV. Tests of Relevance: Current Cases  
To reiterate this paper’s basic argument: The concepts of cooperative security are still relevant to 
the security challenges of the 21st century.  This is particularly true for the U.S.-Russia-Europe 
triangle, but it also has the potential to be applied elsewhere, in policy areas characterized by 
levels of hostility, enmity, and even of limited direct violence.  Success parallel to that of the 
1980s and the 1990s is not assured.  Obstacles need to be overcome: the habits of neglect of the 
last decade and the assumption that the organizational and operational frameworks on which 
present stability and public confidence rest are somehow irreversible or on auto-pilot.  
Rediscovering cooperative security’s precepts and utility for new challenges as well as ensuring 
regular attention and watchfulness to its achievements will take political leadership – in 
Washington, Europe, and Moscow.  This will also require the education and mobilization of 
domestic constituencies, both elite and popular. 
The following section outlines five areas of challenge, all of great importance to the security 
agenda of the transatlantic/Eurasian area.  None are easily resolved; each involves elements of 
short- and long-term risk that could raise the prospect of significant discord or the escalation of 
irritation to conflict.  Each has a different policy profile and utility to the interests of the United 
States, Russia, and Europe, and none promises permanent success or short- or medium-term 
stability.  
Meeting these challenges will require political will and a mixture of traditional and/or innovative 
approaches in a cooperative security framework.  The traditional approach would most often be 
an adaptation of ideas and tools from the first and second phases of cooperative security such as: 
o Demonstration by example;  
o Bilateral and multilateral agreements; 
o Unilateral declarations; 
o Evolutionary long-term design; 
o Available technology; and,  
o Committed funding.    
The more innovative approaches reflect an opportunity to think anew or adapt earlier approaches 
to political changes, new technologies, or different popular expectations that have emerged in the 
past decade.  The challenges may pose unequal risks to each pole of the U.S.-Europe-Russia 
triangle, but each would seem to require new efforts to re-balance relations, as well as a new 
willingness to recognize and adapt policy planning and military preparations to avoid, to the 
highest degree possible, the legitimate security concerns of the others. 




o The general political acceptability of each challenge to critical Eurasian political 
constituencies – elites and attentive policy publics – at least in the United States, Europe, 
and Russia.  
o The political priority that the Obama administration places on each of them.  
The following table reflects my assessment of the political environment.  The cases developed 
below are meant to provoke debate as much as to evaluate an arbitrarily fixed set of options.  In 
that spirit, I also then offer an estimate of how probable it appears that, in each issue area, some 
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Arms control in the broadest sense is where cooperative security began and where there has been 
the most systematic thinking about its future.  The prospects are at best mixed.  Every one of the 
arms control treaties and initiatives that were the hallmarks of the initial cooperative security 
approach had by 2011 suffered disappointment or disaffection, particularly during the Bush era.  
Analyst after analyst now concludes that these treaty arrangements are not suited to the present 
political realities or the threats a Europe at peace now faces – internal threats, terrorism, drugs, 
illegal immigration, etc.  Overwhelming Western conventional superiority even at lower levels of   
both strategic and tactical forces and biting fiscal constraints have changed the nature of threat 
and risk, therefore, there is less and less cause, for example, to monitor maximum numbers of 
delimited military equipment or even specific equipment categories or TLEs.62 
  
Perhaps most under attack has been the OSCE. Its failure in times of trouble has been clear.  It 
approached the conflict of Bosnia in a timely, determined manner only to find that  
its most fervent supporters in general – Germany and the neutrals – did not want it deeply 
involved.  On later incidents, it issued statements of regret but didn’t take specific actions.  In the 
run-up to the 2008 Georgia war, it was not able to use its consultation procedures or even to 
extend the term of its own peacekeeping mission.63  Much of the blame in that instance must be 
given to the opposition of the two protagonists – Russia and Georgia, both members.  Russia was 
able to use its experience and influence within international organizations, particularly the 
OSCE, to ensure that it had the space to act free of constraints.  But neither Europe nor the 
United States expressed enthusiasm about cooperative actions to restore the status quo ante.  The 
stakes, the arms, the depth of the conflict – all meant that most preferred the OSCE to retreat 
from involvement.  
  
The CFE presents a different failure in the face of challenge.  There have been numerous 
attempts to update CFE and its original Cold War-derived formulas and balance.  Most 
extensive, and subsequently most controversial, was the Adapted CFE Treaty (ACFE), which 
was signed in May 1997 at Paris.  Among many other balances it struck a number of detailed 
compromises:  
o It lifted the flank limits on Russia that restricted Russian troop movement on its 
own soil in the South (as proved a problem in the Chechen wars)  
o It established NATO-as-a-whole ceilings for TLE  
o It allowed for the eventual accession of the Baltics and Slovenia  
o It enshrined NATO’s promise not to have permanent stationing of significant 
combat forces in the former Warsaw Pact space, and  
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o It left the deployment and the counting of foreign-force deployments to the host 
nation.  
Intense bargaining over the next two years led to compromise at the November 1999 OSCE 
meeting in Istanbul designed to “modernize” the OSCE.  Russia promised to withdraw its 
leftover military deployments in Georgia and Moldova by a certain date, and conditions were set 
for the accession of new members, including the new NATO members admitted eventually in 
2004, four former Warsaw Pact states and the three former Baltic republics.  
  
Political winds and the Putin team decided otherwise; and thus began a 10-year stalemate, with 
the United States urging its allies not to ratify the adapted CFE until Russia made good on its 
commitment to withdraw its military contingents from the Abkhazia/South Ossetia 
encampments, and those in Transniestria.  Russia tried internal pressure and discussion within 
OSCE to dissuade this campaign and then changed tactics after the failure of the 2006 spring 
review conference.  It then warned all the states that this discrimination against Russia led by the 
Bush Administration (criticizing Russia’s human rights record while overlooking similar 
problems in NATO-aspirant countries including Georgia and Ukraine) would have major 
strategic consequences, especially for the Europeans.  In December 2007, Russia suspended its 
observance of CFE requirements, leading to the present stalemate,64 and by 2012 Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov argued that the CFE was dead.65 
  
What are important here are perhaps not the specifics but the combination of causal factors.  
Camille Grand argues that it reflects what is wrong with all the present cross-Europe  
arrangements:66 
o Too much “benign neglect” on all sides;  
o Russian assertiveness;  
o NATO short-sightedness; and  
o The disappearance of the traditional European “honest brokers” – neutrals and 
others whose major stake is not in a specific political outcome but in the 
continuation and accumulation of the process as a whole.  
Grand’s judgments are a telling assessment of what must be changed in the future if the 
CFE/OSCE framework on which so much day-to-day confidence and certainty are based is to 
continue or even morph into a new, more satisfactory arrangement.  In some ways, he argues, we 
are back to the beginning–the first steps in the mid-1980s.  What is to be done?  
  
There is widespread agreement at the expert and policy level that CFE and indeed all of the 
linked institutions and procedures must be brought into accord with present strategic realities: the 
question is how?  The debate surrounding Medvedev’s proposal may be the perfect vehicle for 
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advancing these arguments. If not, other ways can and should be found.  The formal 
renegotiation of the treaties is probably neither desirable nor necessary given how long the 
process took and the recent experience of the EU with a pattern of recalcitrant (or is it 
ambivalent) countries and leaders.  A post-Lisbon EU with more experience, revived after the 
financial crises and increasingly articulate, can perhaps be entrusted to represent European 
interests now; perhaps a three way U.S.-Russia-EU conversation would be the best thing.  There 
are also short-fuse negotiation tactics and tricks that can be explored if the political will is there.  
It may even be possible to do this given the financial pressures faced now by all defense budgets 
and the consequent need to have more stability and reliability in planning for long lead-time 
purchase.  The acquisition cycle alone means countries will be looking to reduce major 
expenditures and to persuade populations not to forget the more sophisticated technological 
investment for the next two decades or more.   
What is to be involved?  The experience of the last decades suggests devoting far more attention 
to information technologies, to ways of diffusing alarms and information, to allowing quick 
convening and a known response catalogue.  Modern technologies and social networking 
experience, for example, could be harnessed to achieve CBMs almost at the individual level.67  
At lower force levels, too, there should be more concern about covering or at least linking-in 
observation and measurement of paramilitary and homeland defense forces, which are now 
sufficiently powerful in comparison to the shrinking traditional armies to disturb the peace, as in 
Georgia and throughout the Southern Caucasus and the Balkans.  Perhaps most importantly of all 
for the future, there should be more attention to the unconventional forces (e.g. unmanned 
vehicles for surveillance and reporting) and new technologies (e.g. robotics) that seem critical for 
particular outcomes.  The ideas of systematic review and evaluation on a regular transparent 
basis need also to be strengthened. The comprehensive EU review of Georgia mentioned earlier 
is one good example, embodying the idea of “community accountability” and the possibility of a 
nonpartisan attribution of blame and perhaps recommendations for national trials, investigations, 
and enforcement.  It would certainly help in the terrorist cases now facing the EU; it could 
provide a vehicle for a different Russian response in the South Caucasus cauldron.  
  
Several years ago, Gregory Govan, a distinguished U.S. military leader and long-time CFE-
OSCE negotiator, argued the case for “wing walking,” that is, for drawing on the old lessons of 
the carnival aerial barnstormers, of holding on to what we have now in good order  
before moving on to a new phase.68  In his view, a clear-eyed perspective on where CFE has 
foundered is needed to determine what legacy can and should be preserved, and what should be 
slowly but surely dismantled.  It is important to remember that CFE was never about resolving 
every outstanding conflict in Europe (see, for example, the frozen conflicts of Nagorno-
Karabakh or even the Georgian cases) but about changing the odds for risk reduction, crisis 
prevention, and rapid responses to dampen most, or at least some of the riskiest conflict, civilian 
and military.  
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Jeffrey McCausland’s list of potential improvements includes two other interesting elements.69  
The first is to strengthen and renew the Military Doctrinal Forums under the Forum for Security 
Cooperation (FSC).  This is important to do: as NATO renews its own Strategic Concept, Russia 
has just completed parts of its own strategic review, and the United States too.  The goal would 
be to increase military-to-military dialogue that in its regularity and transparency is somewhat 
more sheltered from bilateral political pressures or overall diplomatic atmospheres.  The most 
important achievement might simply be the extension of the “no surprises” rule beloved by 
military elites; but certainly critical is a basic understanding of decisions taken, even if there is 
not agreement, in order to avoid miscalculation or escalating irritations.  A second goal might be 
to accelerate the collection and emulation of best practices.  One clear area would be to expand 
the lessons learned and the procedures under the Wassenaar Agreements, the accords now signed 
by 40 countries, to promote transparency about cross-border transfers of equipment and 
technology.  This would supplement similar initiatives in the nuclear field and allow greater 
reassurance especially of Russian fears about American transfers and conventional superiority.  
  
Finally, there are the questions studiously avoided twenty years ago but perhaps more accessible 
now: the linking together of requirements and procedures of the various substantive regimes in 
an overarching framework to achieve greater predictability and stability.  The arguments twenty 
years ago as to why this might put too much pressure on accords or focus political pressure too 
narrowly on informal accords may still be sound, but they seem vaguely outdated in a time of a 
Lisbon Europe and instant Internet communication.70  The prominent unease about future nuclear 
weapons deployments – even what to do with the complex of nuclear arrangements, especially 
the status of NSNW in NATO, the INF Treaty, the PNIs, and the hosting/storage infrastructure – 
might all be folded in to ensure at least greater transparency.71  
 
NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept took direct aim at the issues of Russian deployments and 
doctrine regarding the NSNW it holds on its territory west of the Urals.72  It is hard to envision 
further unilateral NATO nuclear reductions without parallel Russian reductions and direct 
cooperation with Moscow over the coming years on a host of broad security issues. 
From the vantage point of early 2012, the prospects for a follow-on arms control treaty to New 
START appear dim. Most experts interviewed believe that it will take considerable time to 
negotiate such an agreement, and that significant verification issues remain to be resolved.  
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Nevertheless, some proposals have been put forth and discussed.73  A future treaty could be a 
bilateral negotiation on global ceilings for U.S. and Russian deployed and nondeployed strategic 
and nonstrategic warheads, possibly with a common number governing all categories and 
involving the choice and the freedom to mix.  Some argue that such an accord might still not 
adequately address NSNW limits if there is freedom to mix warheads under a common ceiling. 
A polarized U.S. domestic political environment makes treaties difficult to ratify and further 
complicates negotiations on an agreement to limit NSNW or other nuclear weapons.  The 
relatively modest New START treaty was only ratified after a drawn out political battle between 
the White House and parts of the Republican leadership in the Senate, even though the treaty was 
supported by virtually the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment.  Russian domestic bargains, 
especially politico-military are no less complicated. 
Interim NSNW measures are needed, though there is no significant progress on the horizon.  
U.S. officials have called for increased NSNW transparency on a reciprocal and parallel basis 
through data exchanges and verification.  Most European allies appear to support the concept of 
parallel transparency as a step towards further arms control as indicated in a spring 2011 “food 
for thought” or “non-paper” signed by ten allies, including Germany and Poland.74  There have 
also been a number of unofficial discussions, notably among think tanks working with or close to 
governments, on possible verification measures, adapting process elements both from strategic 
nuclear monitoring and from earlier conventional inspection/verification schemes.  The data 
exchange could include the numbers, locations, and types of weapons within agreed categories 
and be accompanied by the specification and adoption of appropriate verification measures.  
Agreements, either bilateral U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia, could include issues such as the 
relocation of warheads to specified geographic limits (say, a non-deployments zone on either 
side of the NATO-Russia border or further restrictions on exercises), mutual or reciprocal 
reductions, and/or the consolidation of deployment or storage sites.75  Each approach would have 
advantages and disadvantages.  The relocation of Russia NSNWs to the east would comfort 
NATO allies but would create concerns for Japan and China, as well as undercut Moscow’s 
hopes for a global INF ban to parallel its agreement with the United States.  Reciprocal 
reductions (e.g., 30 percent each, rather than a specific number) would lead to larger numerical 
cuts for Russia, but would leave NATO with very few remaining U.S. weapons on European 
soil.  A consolidation of NATO sites may allow the United States to have greater opportunities 
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beyond “nuclear presence” to affect “nuclear sharing.”76  Russian leaders also stress the need for 
more comprehensive negotiations that include conventional weapons, missile defense, and space 
– all of which would clearly extend and complicate NSNW talks.  The success of an interim arms 
control step designed to enhance transparency and potentially achieve proportional reductions, 
while consolidating and relocating NSNW sites, would require close consultation with allies and 
careful negotiations with Russia.  But it presents by far the best path to “create the conditions” 
for further NSNW reductions. 
A somewhat different but not mutually exclusive approach would begin with a renewal of 
existing CBMs and the initiation of new cooperation, exchange, and transparency measures. 
NATO and Russia, or, initially the United States and Russia, might exchange information on the 
safety and security of their weapons and storage sites.  New officer exchange programs involving 
specialists as well as promising officers could explore common understandings about these 
weapons and their possible effects. Indeed this has been done under the auspices of cooperative 
threat reduction on a range of nuclear issues.  Seminars, such as the OSCE doctrine seminars 
held in Vienna in the 1990s and those occasionally held under the NRC, could restart regular 
exchanges on nuclear doctrine and strategy, even at the unclassified level.  NATO and Russia 
could hold joint exercises to practice responses to nuclear accidents and develop standards for 
nuclear forensics.  Lessons can also be learned from the NATO-Russia discussions on the critical 
assumptions that supported planning for the eight European missile defense 
exercises/simulations that began in 2002 and were halted after the Georgia War.  These might 
well be introduced at the next missile defense exercises scheduled for 2012 in Germany. 
Other forms of cooperation could also increase confidence and transparency, and diminish 
Russian and CEE security concerns that might otherwise prompt resistance to NSNW reductions.  
Many involve refreshing or refashioning areas of cooperation from the past (e.g., the treaty-based 
data exchanges under the continuing Open Skies agreements) or refashioning new cooperation 
initiatives (e.g., the logistics pact on supply transit of Russian territory in support of Afghanistan) 
into new instruments or organizations against terrorist threats or major disasters.  Similarly, the 
record and experience of ~6,000 CFE inspections, which have proceeded without incident and 
with great success, could be added to the experiences gained under other regimes.  The 
development of a corps of inspectors and the creation of an EU or regional inspectorate with 
specific mandates and that is trained to common or cooperative professional standards would 
reduce the usual ad hoc improvisation that characterizes crisis responses.  To cite Vice President 
Biden’s May 2010 op-ed, this would allow for more effective conflict-prevention, conflict-
management, and crisis-resolutions mechanisms that would increase regional stability and 
security.77 
Another very accessible mechanism that could be relatively quickly expanded is the Cooperative 
Airspace Initiative (CAI), a project begun in 2002 under the NRC along the NATO-Russia 
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border as a mutual counter-terrorism effort and has also increased transparency and predictability 
within the regional airspace domain.78  In several respects, this initiative suggests a model for 
missile-defense data exchange and demonstrates how relatively inexpensive such initiatives can 
be given their potential use of off-the-shelf hardware and software.  Russia and 11 NATO states 
have invested significantly in the network, establishing eight communications nodes (four in 
Russia, two in Poland, and one each in Norway and Turkey) to transmit ground sensor data that 
tracks civil aircraft activity 150 kilometers on either side of the border to either a NATO or 
Russian coordination center (CC).  The CCs then inform their counterparts in real time. The 
system reached international operational status after “end of concept” proofing in June 2011, and 
experts have declared that the system’s remaining technical issues are “easily resolvable.” 
CAI’s expansion into the monitoring of military aircraft activity could follow upon agreement on 
operational rules and procedures.  This was foreseen in 2002, has been tried in Scandinavian 
exercises on “rogue aircraft” under the Baltic Council, and has attracted measurable support and 
little outright opposition within Russia as within the Alliance.  It could also usefully be expanded 
geographically in Europe to cover a wide swath of NATO and Russian territory or as the NRC 
has suggested, to allow the participation of other states, NATO members including the United 
States, and members of the Partnership for Peace program, and neutrals.  Beginning in 2006, 
officials have even moved to expand the initiative or parallel it in other non-European areas: a 
proposed expansion of counter-terrorism cooperation under the U.S.-Russia Presidential 
Working Group; and the NORAD move in 2006 to examine possible CAP links across the 
Bering Straits.  In the view of several American proponents, CAI might also be used as a base for 
a NATO-Russia cruise missile defense concept that could affect or employ Russian S-family 
interceptors.79 
A similar, functionally driven form of cooperation might also flow from the 2011 Arctic pact on 
search and research cooperation.  This would fit with the NRC’s functional charter, and respond 
to the likelihood that increased maritime traffic, anticipated as a result of global warming, will 
strain existing national capabilities to deal with disaster or crisis.  The activities under this pact 
would involve not only dialogue and planning but would naturally flow into cooperative training 
regimes, the exchange of “best practice” materials and procedures, and allow the building of new 
predictable consultations, despite the continuing national disagreements on specific sovereign 
limits. 
There is, in short, more than enough to be done.  Greater transparency and accountability, 
whether unilaterally declared or multilaterally agreed, would represent significant gains in almost 
every category of arms reduction and monitoring.  What is needed on all sides is a greater sense 
of urgency, political will, and the recruitment of an expanded talent pool to execute the resulting 
plan. 
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A second test focuses on the area of great success in 1989-1991: the institutionalization and 
“routinization” of contacts and practices through the establishment of a spider web of 
organizations that were mutually reinforcing and all essentially oriented toward risk reduction 
through transparency and verification. 
The two most important Western multilateral organizations (NATO and the EU) have, 
diplomatically phrased, an imperfect record of coordination and cooperation. This record has 
been exaggerated by political rhetoric, especially during the last eight years, where both Europe 
and the United States gained from emphasizing divisions.  In particular, France has at times 
gloried in stressing the ties that divide, both as a tribute to a Gaullist vision still worth political 
capital in France, and as a crucial bargaining chip against Germany and its balanced ties with 
Washington.  Other divisions stretch back into fundamental differences about process and 
perceptions, discussed elsewhere in greater detail.80  Indeed, while the objectives of the EU’s 
foreign policy and defense apparatus (such as it is) and NATO are largely similar, their political 
methods and organizational capabilities vary in important ways that have serious implications for 
the future of cooperative security.  
In the last several years, though, much has changed.  France, in a reversal of 40 years of policy, 
rejoined the integrated military structures of NATO and took over two commands, the 
Transformation Command (ACT) in Norfolk and the Joint Forces Command in Lisbon.  The 
French public’s silence at this move was remarkable, a tribute perhaps to the power of the French 
presidency and of Sarkozy himself over the traditional critics on the left (stirred by often-visceral 
anti-Americanism) and on the right (children of de Gaulle with a potent fear of German 
preeminence in NATO).81  Nuclear forces were explicitly excluded from the agreement, leaving 
French claims of total independence for the force de frappe still questionable but legally intact.82  
A major factor in this turn was that under Sarkozy, the search for a French-led independent EU 
foreign policy and an organized EU military component larger than that dictated by Petersberg 
appears to have been shelved for the near term, if not for the indefinite future.  The French 
military in particular is enthusiastic about the ACT assignment and the new opportunities it 
presents for both influence and resources.83 
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Europe’s evolution toward an independent European foreign policy and a European foreign 
service, meanwhile, remains somewhat of a mystery both to insiders and U.S. officials.  The 
Lisbon process had been virtually stagnant for the better part of eight years, and almost no one in 
Washington not directly responsible for European policy understood it or paid close attention to 
it.84 What post-Lisbon Europe will look like – and be capable of – is less clear-cut.  Ambassador 
Daalder has described post-Lisbon NATO as NATO 3.0, and emphasized NATO’s role in 
enabling cooperative action.  In terms of the European leadership there have been few indicators 
– say, in the Libya campaign or in the broad reactions to the Arab Spring –that the EU president, 
Belgian Herman van Rompuy, and the foreign minister, Britain’s Catherine Ashton, have been 
influential enough to promote substantial agreement, let alone a united European foreign policy 
both within and beyond the Union.  They seem to have ended up in the tradition of pre-Lisbon 
EU leaders – bureaucrats-in-chief without the power to override disparate national interests or 
present a serious and viable face to outsiders.  On immediate appraisal, neither appears the kind 
of figure to “stop the traffic” in Beijing or Washington, a trait British foreign secretary David 
Miliband had suggested should be a prime qualification for the job.  Neither seems likely to 
make the world see Europe anew nor to project a vigorous European unity on the world stage.  
Instead, Europe chose a pair of unprepossessing, unremarkable, inoffensive politician-
technocrats.  Both could still do a capable job.  But the chances of major developments in EU 
foreign policy seem as distant now as at any point in the pre-Lisbon years.  The lack of 
consensus on how and within which institutional framework to deal with Russia alone is 
stunning. 
Other controversies also remain.  The “neutral” countries have been mollified with several 
concessions in the wording of the Lisbon Treaty to calm their concerns – what practical impact 
this will have on the foreign policy process or on these countries’ neutrality remains to be 
proven.  Likewise, only experience will show whether the new structures help overcome 
divisions on some issues or whether they simply reinforce a continuation of past practice – with 
unanimity exceedingly scarce as always on major policies, such as the unified EU approach to 
Russia or Iran or even Libya.   
The other major barrier to cooperation between the two institutions is their differing capabilities, 
and the different methods of problem solving they drive. NATO is a military alliance and can 
call on the immense power-projecting potential of the U.S. armed forces.  The EU has not come 
close to being able to project military power in the same way, nor does it wish to do so.  
However, there is plenty of overlap in their activities and their membership, which ensures 
continuous collaboration.  The 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) outlines the political underpinnings of the relationship – mutual respect, 
consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency, and the rest.85  After months of heated 
discussion, the Berlin-Plus arrangements of 2002 allow NATO to offer the EU nearly its entire 
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toolkit (with the notable exception of nuclear weapons) for EU missions.  According to 
coordinated EU and NATO decision making, there is to be a range of support for EU Defense 
Forces, making available assets and capabilities that are to a major degree American assets 
assigned to NATO, including equipment and transport, command arrangements, and operational 
planning assistance.  NATO can still play a role in EU-led missions even when it is not itself 
engaged – and has done so in the cases of Operation Concordia in Macedonia in 2003 and 
EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2004 (see Appendix 2).   
Moreover, with the exception of Chirac’s France (and on occasion Spain and Belgium), most 
national and EU leaders have always argued that the EU has a comparative advantage in 
focusing on non-military solutions – the use of economic aid, trade, sanctions, and political 
pressure to pursue its intentions. These differences ought not necessarily to prompt tension 
between the EU and NATO – indeed, the two should form a neat synergy.  However, the division 
of labor rather than how to cooperate and strengthen the synergy has been the subject of endless 
wrangling almost since the wall fell in 1989.  After Bosnia, some European states – particularly 
France and Germany but also some of the small states – have complained that this means the EU 
gets to clean up the messes the United States has unilaterally decided to make and over which 
they have little control.  The dramatic refusal of Germany, France, and Turkey to cooperate with 
the invasion of Iraq did not fully reveal the widespread dissatisfaction of European elites over 
American unilateralism, because most leaders carefully stood in the shadow of these countries 
and unofficially supported their opposition.  
The tools available shape (and are shaped by) the political preferences of the membership, and 
historically European countries have tended to rate threats differently and to prefer non-military 
solutions.  
Dangers to World Peace86 
% saying ‘great danger’Iran US in IraqNorth KoreaIsraeli-Palestinian Conflict 
US 46 31 34 43 
UK 34 41 19 45 
France 31 36 16 35 
Germany 51 40 23 51 
Spain 38 55 21 52 
Russia 20 45 10 41 
Indonesia 7 31 4 33 
Egypt 14 56 14 68 
Jordan 19 58 18 67 
Turkey 16 60 6 42 
Pakistan 4 28 8 22 
Nigeria 15 25 11 27 
Japan 29 29 45 40 
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India 8 15 6 13 
China 22 31 11 27 
 
The table of views on threats to world peace (regrettably not replicated since 2006 in Pew public 
opinion studies) also reveals the difference in perspectives Americans and Europeans have about 
what matters most in global relations, especially when confronting threats of violence or illegal 
actions.  Many of the rankings may have changed in the last several years, and the gap between 
U.S. and European attitudes may now be considerably smaller, but the effect of the “near enemy” 
is likely to remain pronounced for Europeans.  
In general, the United States has a wider lens and a penchant for pre-emptive or preventative 
action as a threat builds.  A good example is the continued enthusiasm for an Iran strike and the 
“bomb Iran” rhetoric from some U.S. commentators, while Europeans tend to favor a status quo 
or go-slow approach, or simply to consign problems to the United States and its far greater 
capabilities.87  This gap in attitudes cannot be underestimated.  True to its foreign policy tradition 
and “pioneer spirit,” the U.S. public and leadership have proven notably more willing to resort to 
the use of force – a dispute being replayed in the continuing debate over burden sharing 
and ROEs (rules of engagement) in Afghanistan.88  
1. Russia and the New Institutionalization: After the Medvedev Plan  
Sometimes it is useful to review the evolution of a policy failure to assess underlying causes and 
unresolvable paradoxes.  The failed Medvedev plan for a cooperative international security 
system outlined in a series of speeches given through 2008 and 2009, was to allow Russia a full, 
integrated and equal share in choices about European and Eurasian security 
The draft European Security Treaty was released in November 2009, giving a first formal 
indication of Russian intent and solidifying the rather vague outline that had previously been 
described.89  In a speech Medvedev gave in Berlin in 2008, he envisaged a  “genuinely equal 
cooperation between Russia, the European Union and North America as three branches of 
European civilization.”  “Atlanticism has had its day,” meaning NATO cannot go on making 
decisions without wider consultation.  However, other organizations with potential, such as the 
OSCE, are held back by “the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old 
line of bloc politics.”  At a joint 2009 press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
Medvedev stated that NATO and the EU should be involved in the creation of the new 
organization, alongside the OSCE, the CIS, and the CSTO, and could become institutional 
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parties to the treaty.  He also remarked that national interest should not be the focus, but that all 
countries should be looking for common cooperative solutions.90   
But the hooks were in the details.  Existing NATO members were unlikely to accede to the 
formulation in the draft, including Article 9.2 (“The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their 
obligations under other international agreements in the area of security, which are in effect on the 
date of signing of this Treaty, are not incompatible with the Treaty”), which appeared to give the 
new document primacy over any and all past or future international security agreements – 
including NATO.  The future role and relevance of the OSCE was even more complicated. The 
Medvedev plan foresaw an organization with no ideals beyond the combined national interests of 
members – objectives, such as democracy promotion, development, and human rights, which 
have been at the core of OSCE’s original purpose.91  As Dmitri Trenin pointed out in October 
2009, Medvedev’s plan distinctly identified problems with the current set-up; countries beyond 
the NATO space, such as the Caucasus and the Crimea, have no stable security arrangement, 
falling through gaps in the present architecture.92  The OSCE had proven incapable of shoring up 
their situation, thus it was a positive step that the Russian leadership wanted to tackle that 
problem, even though the method of achieving that was neither clear nor proven. 
The biggest question of all, though, is why the West should voluntarily reconsider existing 
organizations. Another unresolved issue is the role of the Russia-led or Russia-preferred treaty 
organizations (see Appendix 1 for memberships and overlaps).  So far, the West has avoided 
formal institutional relationships with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), just 
as it has also done from the beginning with the predecessor CIS.  It has deemed it undesirable to 
confer such credibility to groups driven by, and almost entirely comprised of, non-democracies 
with blemished human rights records and unrealistic in its implication of “political-military 
symmetry” between, for example, CSTO and NATO, or even on occasion, CSTO and the EU.93  
The member states – Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan – have until recently had little more than virtual ties to one another, and most have 
operated principally through bilateral relations or a “hub and spoke” system with Russia.  
Threats surrounding the fighting in Afghanistan have given more reasons to confer, and to create 
a rapid deployment force, roughly parallel to the U.S. force that is so vital for logistics in 
Afghanistan, and to build a Russian base in Kyrgyzstan to organize and support it.94  In 2009, 
there were also well-publicized efforts to secure full recognition of the CSTO as a supplier of 
crisis support and peacekeeping forces to the UN and to secure recognition from NATO itself.  
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Another organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), has attracted greater 
interest from the West.  The SCO offers a formal linkage between China and Russia in the 
critical policy areas of energy, security, and trade, and it has at least the potential to play a 
critical role in Central Asia and redefine many geopolitical relationships within the post-Cold 
War/post-Afghanistan regional shakeups that are certain to occur.95  The SCO is now composed 
of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – with Pakistan, India, 
Iran, and Mongolia as observers.  The United States early on flirted with asking for a form of 
limited observer status, especially given its interests in Afghanistan and the energy resources in 
the region.  But after a 2005 SCO call for a timetable for American withdrawal of its anti-terror 
forces in Afghanistan and subsequent pressure about U.S. forces leaving the base at Manas, 
Kyrgyzstan, its interest has drawn back.  Under Bush at least, American policy leaders viewed 
the institution as of little consequence or a mere bullhorn for anti-American criticism.  Russia 
itself has been somewhat ambivalent, trying regularly and without much success to go beyond 
joint exercises and strategy discussions to recast the SCO as a political-military pact with 
potential force mobilization capabilities.  Its preferred model is again suzerainty, with even 
greater emphasis in its eastern “near abroad” as exercising selective intervention into domestic 
policy and patterns of governance as well.  But China has been adamant that the CSO should 
primarily be used to develop regional economic capabilities and exchanges and to remain at a 
traditional inter-governmental level to deal only with issues of mutual concern. 
Medvedev ultimately admitted that his plan had no future and had garnered almost no support 
from other countries.96  Yet, there was some momentum around the idea of treating both NATO 
and the CSTO more seriously, or at least legitimizing repeated Russian calls for new institutional 
linkages for the 21st century.  In a pioneering 2009 Foreign Affairs piece, former National 
Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski proposed an advantageous institutional option for NATO 
vis-à-vis Russia but also other CEE states.97  He suggested setting aside reservations “in the 
event that a joint agreement for security cooperation in Eurasia and beyond were to contain a 
provision respecting the right of current nonmembers to eventually seek membership in either 
NATO or the CSTO – and perhaps, at a still more distant point, even in both...  A NATO-CSTO 
treaty containing such a proviso would constitute an indirect commitment by Russia not to 
obstruct the eventual adhesion to NATO of either Ukraine or Georgia in return for the de facto 
affirmation by NATO that in neither case is membership imminent.”  The Medvedev draft 
included hints in this direction, but provided no clear route to its achievement.  In this instance, 
however, the West’s position is also hard to judge - such a step would certainly be a significant 
shift in attitude for a number of big participants, most obviously the United States, but as part of 
a second phase of the “reset” program, it may well not be off the table.98   
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It is also striking how similar many of the remarks coming from Western statesmen about the 
Medvedev Plan echo the terms used to describe the Helsinki process in the 1970s.  Then, too, the 
Russian side insisted on American non-participation, and then relented. That program was 
accused in many quarters of being intended to weaken the Atlantic Alliance, of having no 
obvious advantages over existing arrangements, and of being wholly favorable to the Kremlin.  
Yet the outcome of that process – the OSCE – is now the status quo being defended, and the 
Helsinki Final Treaty is seen as one of the diplomatic pinnacles of the Cold War era.  As Henry 
Kissinger observed, “[rarely] has a diplomatic process so illuminated the limitations of human 
foresight.”99  Dismissing the Medvedev Plan out of hand risked curtailing a negotiation that 
could have yielded an agreement that would have defined the post-Cold War age in much the 
same way as the Helsinki Final Treaty set out the path of the latter stages of the Cold War.   
Much of this paper’s analysis suggests the need to address in an assured manner the lack of a 
continuing forum for NATO-Russia interchange and consultation.  Initial NATO-Russia 
agreements envisaged that the NRC would fulfill such a function.100  Instead, in the almost two 
decades of its existence, both NATO and Russia have neglected the NRC, excluded it from 
significant discussions held elsewhere in NATO, and expressed disappointment at its failure to 
serve as a consultation or planning body worthy of high level or even consistent participation. 
The Lisbon Summit’s reemphasis on the NRC paralleled the lines of reset between Moscow and 
Washington, and filled in the space left by the consistently disappointing EU-Russia 
consultations and in the often-dysfunctional OSCE debates.  Some Russian leaders interviewed 
for this paper suggested that while Russia is still not granted proportionate influence, the NRC 
under Secretary-General Rasmussen’s leadership is now far more of a meeting of 29 rather than 
the 28 versus 1 confrontation that many Russians condemned in the Bush era.  Its working 
groups have attracted far more skilled participants and observers than in the past; its meetings 
serve in several important new projects, including the missile defense cooperation and counter-
terrorism efforts. 
The question is whether it is possible or desirable to transform the NRC into an even more 
effective body, with a deeper staff and more call on NATO decision-making authorities.  A 
regular meeting calendar would require all participants to at least show up and be accessible, 
even if it also allows for public stonewalling.  At this point, both the United States and Russia 
prefer bilateral deals in the strategic area; NSNW is surely one of the designated areas for such 
an agreement.  Yet, the NRC might prove a good stage for trial balloons and for a safety fuse for 
both sides.  It could also be a center for oversight – of new or old inspection regimes, of training 
cooperation, and of expanding work on definitions and the adoption of new technologies. 
One further organizational change, perhaps now a goal rather than a realistic possibility, is an 
expansion of the NRC’s earlier efforts at unclassified discussions of broad nuclear doctrine 
issues and exchanges of strategic views.  This was part of the NRC initial mandate, but faded in 
importance in the late 1990s as action moved into bilateral U.S.-Russia channels.  NRC 
exchanges in this area might parallel exchanges in the U.S.-Russia channels, e.g., those at 
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STRATCOM in the 1990s or the earlier CHOD (Chief of Defense Staff) exchanges.  A major 
stumbling block would be the encrusted bureaucracy and procedures of the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group, which, with the support of strong national constituencies, has successfully 
resisted reform or major adaptation to the post-1991 character of the European security 
landscape.  Yet, transparency about future actions is a critical component of reassurance, both for 
allies and the NATO-Russia domains. 
A strengthened NRC might also be a mechanism for expanding transparency mechanisms on a 
multilateral basis to other NATO nations beyond the United States (including perhaps the 
remaining near PFP members) in order to prepare for new roles in the next round of arms 
reductions.  Present plans foresee that the next round of negotiations will include nuclear powers 
beyond the United States and Russia; this might well be a good proving ground and one that will 
allow other NATO states some insight into their decision making.   
Around the fixed point of the NRC, there could eventually be supplemental arrangements with 
the CSTO and perhaps the SCO.  These would be enhanced by stronger commitments to 
transparency.  Crisis management between Russia and NATO has proven hopelessly weak under 
the strain of major events (Georgia especially), so the inclusion of improved communication and 
data-exchange systems could have practical benefits. 
This tack would parallel and hold out merits similar to the 2009 plan outlined by Brzezinski. By 
engaging Russia on terms that give it a valuable stake in not just the outcome but the process, it 
would harness Russian pride and prestige to identify mutually acceptable settlements.  By 
encouraging Russia to operate in multilateral processes, it would give the West the opportunity 
to monitor its conduct at closer hand than has occurred in the more standoffish arrangements 
currently witnessed, and to nurture learning on both sides from each others’ actions.  By 
recognizing the CSTO and establishing the accompanying institutional requirements, the West 
gives up little while getting the benefits of regularized interaction with Russia and the CSTO, as 
well as the SCO.  Brzezinski, at least, thinks there is value in allowing Russia to save face in 
exchange for ensuring communication.  As cooperative security advocates have argued from the 
beginning, the development of means of cooperation beyond slow-moving and confrontational 
treaty negotiations (joint military training exercises, cultural, scientific and educational 
exchanges) can enable cooperation to progress between the headlines.  If an NRC arrangement 
can incorporate these positives while searching (admittedly with little chance of immediate 
success) for a major paradigm shift in the East-West institutional relationship, it would be a 




One of the near-term testing grounds for a new vision of cooperative security that would 
demonstrate concrete results quickly is the plan for a missile defense system in Europe. 
Championed by President George W. Bush throughout his administration, missile defense 
(MD) plans became the symbol of an American unilateralism that alienated allies, and enraged 




cooperative security system gone seriously awry and approaching the point of no return.101  
While it entailed more informal consultation than was usually publicly acknowledged, the Bush 
plan essentially bypassed both NATO allies and the Russians, refusing to acknowledge the 
potential qualms of other states in favor of bilateral deals and a strategy vis-à-vis Iran that 
appeared, and was, almost exclusively American in interest.  Obama has revised these decisions 
in alternative plans for an MD system that, as now outlined, lacks a cooperative security core.  
There is evidence, though, to suggest that the United States is now searching for a cooperative 
solution, with more serious consideration of involving Russia as a partner, inviting interested 
allies to join, and extending its benefits beyond the borders of Europe itself into the Middle East, 
East Asia, and other regional areas of tension. 
Judging by 2010 data on CEE opinion, the United States would have been better off had it never 
begun with the Bush initiatives, as both CEE and Baltic countries felt the disappointment of 
Obama’s reorientation keenly and saw it as a pro-Russian.  In 2011, the Czech Republic 
withdrew from the cooperation once it was clear that it would not have an important, exclusive 
role as the principal radar base. In Poland and Romania, relations were reparable, in light of new 
American promises of air defense equipment and training, but recent interviews suggest that the 
policy shift left the Poles wondering about Obama’s basic attention to their security concerns.102 
In order to understand the status of the missile defense plans for Europe, and how it relates to the 
larger concept of cooperative security, it is necessary to understand the history of the 
Bush missile defense plans.  The ultimate failure of those plans, and the Obama administration’s 
attempts to reorient them, are classic cases demonstrating the failures and promises of a 
cooperative security strategy.  
1. The Past 
The Bush administration first aggressively pushed for the deployment of MD in Europe 
beginning in 2006, but the campaign was the culmination of a fundamental shift in the direction 
that the Bush administration took in the field of arms control and defense.103  Establishing 
missile defense systems as part of a larger strategy to shift to a proactive military defense 
approach against weapons of mass destruction was in Bush’s plans even before he took office, 
evidenced when he announced in a 1999 campaign speech at The Citadel military college that his 
administration would “deploy anti-ballistic missile systems, both theater and national, to guard 
against attack and blackmail.”104  
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The rough plans date back to before the Bush took office.  Setting the tone for Bush’s fervent 
support of a missile defense system was the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to 
the United States, an independent commission convened by the U.S. Congress in 1998 to assess 
the potential threat of ballistic missiles to the security of the United States (and key allies such as 
Japan and NATO members).  The commission was led by Donald Rumsfeld, George H. W. 
Bush’s Secretary of Defense, and largely focused on new, post-Cold War military threats.105 
Despite the commission’s findings, the Clinton Administration announced in its last days that it 
would not move ahead with plans for the deployment of a National Missile Defense program 
(NMD).  Clinton argued that MD technologies were still largely unproven, that a system would 
entail a breach in the core ABM Treaty limits, and that deployment would likely meet opposition 
from NATO allies. Ever protective of the ABM treaty, European states feared that an MD 
program could negatively provoke Russia into another arms race, as well as leave the continent 
more susceptible to retaliatory attacks.  Significantly, Russia acknowledged Clinton’s refusal to 
commit to an extensive MD program, and pledged to work with the United States on a more 
limited multilateral system in the future.106   
Early in his first term, Bush signaled a major policy shift on missile defense: High-level officials 
immediately began emphatically making the case for the deployment of a system in Europe as 
well as in Asia, arguing that NATO had become more susceptible to political coercion and 
blackmail.  In 2002, the United States, withdrew from the ABM treaty citing the need to 
undertake new tests against the new threats.  It began to explore in earnest the possibility of 
establishing in Europe an effective multilayered defense system involving air, sea, and land 
assets, including a series of exercises with interested allies and Russia.107  Bush officials also 
began unofficial probes and preliminary talks as early as 2001 in several CEE states (including 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) over the possibility of U.S. missile defense bases on 
their soil. In 2006, as the Bush team pursued a more aggressive program to blunt Iran’s 
increasing nuclear ambitions, it began to press hard on Poland and the Czech Republic.  The 
NATO Council was informally briefed about the program outside of formal sessions but was not 
consulted, which led to conflict down the line.  
In February of 2007, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek announced that the Czech Republic 
and Poland were prepared to station 10 missile interceptors on Polish soil, and locate a site for a 
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radar detection system in the Czech Republic.  The announcement caused great consternation, 
with major European allies claiming that they neither had been consulted nor were convinced, 
especially after Iraq, about American claims of urgency regarding an Iranian missile threat.108  
Russian outrage stressed that the plan threatened their security, despite repeated American efforts 
to demonstrate technically that these limited forces would have no utility against existing 
Russian missile capability.  Russian military figures, past and present, thundered at the breaking 
of the Gorbachev-Bush agreements of 1990 on NATO deployments in Eastern Europe 
(reaffirmed at the time of the 1997 NRC Founding Agreement), and hinted at the immediate 
suspension of existing East-West arms control agreements such as CFE and the INF agreements 
while prompting a return to Cold War rhetoric.109   
At the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, the U.S. delegation attempted to pressure allies to 
find an agreement on missile defense.  In the final communiqué, all allies appeared to endorse 
the concept of a missile defense system on their own territory, acknowledging “the substantial 
contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the 
planned deployment of European-based United States missile defense assets.”  The United States 
made this a high priority “legacy” objective, utilizing senior officials, including Vice President 
Cheney, to negotiate with the Poles in the hopes of guaranteeing a deal before the end of Bush’s 
term.    
After the August 2008 war in Georgia, the shift in transatlantic debate allowed the United States 
to proceed rapidly with efforts to deploy an MD system.  Poland was clearly concerned about 
resurgent Russian power and wanted a guarantee of American backing and a “special 
relationship.”  The former top Polish missile defense negotiator, Witold Waszczykowski, 
suggested some months later that the delay in reaching an agreement was entirely political, and 
that Prime Minister Donald Tusk wanted to prevent President Lech Kaczynski from receiving 
any credit for the deal. Waszcykowski forcefully declared, “I got the impression that political 
interests were more important than the safety of the nation.”  He was promptly fired.110  Key 
European allies had begun to warm to the idea of a system as long as it remained clearly limited 
in capability and non-nuclear in its makeup.  In part, this also reflected growing European 
exasperation with Iran and their inability to slow the emerging Iranian nuclear program.  
Some European states, and many American strategic analysts, charged that the system presented 
a regional bias, leaving some NATO states and associates – Turkey, Greece, and the Balkans in 
particular – unprotected against Iran because of their proximity to the rogue state.111  In several 
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respects, this provided a realistic view of risks; inequitable coverage would prove costly, not 
only for the NATO guarantee system, but also the delicate politics of integration within the 
European Union.  Many officials, including the previous NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer, found this distinction problematic, as it would de-facto separate NATO countries into 
“A-grade and B-grade” allies.  The U.S. promised to provide closer-in theater missile defense 
systems, such as Patriot and potentially sea-based Aegis missiles, but by spring 2008, these plans 
had yet to be fleshed out, let alone implemented.112  German Chancellor Angela Merkel was 
among the most vocal actors, asserting that any missile defense system in Europe should be 
“seen as a task for the alliance collectively,” rather than strictly an American endeavor.113  
Echoing the divisive alliance debate over Iraq in 2002-2003, albeit at a lower level, the 
administration continued to define the system as a national project, relying on bilateral 
agreements with the Czech and Polish governments that would then be “presented” to NATO.   
2.  U.S.-Russia Relations  
U.S.-Russian tensions are a core issue of missile defense discussions.  A cooperative Russian-
U.S. strategic partnership has remained in question throughout.114  Is it possible?  Is it even 
desirable?  
U.S.-Russian antagonism was present from the beginning, when Russia extended olive branches 
that would have provided Russian cooperation or involvement in a MD system in Europe from 
the first stages.115  In late spring 2007, in a meeting with Bush, Putin seemingly unexpectedly 
offered the use of the Russian-operated Gabala radar system, based in Azerbaijan, as a substitute 
for the Czech site.  He also suggested the sustained deployment of Russian observers at the 
potential interceptor base in Poland.  While the Pentagon tried to cast these moves as theater, 
Putin quickly followed up with a second offer, a more advanced radar site in Armavir, which 
would provide an unrivalled view of Iranian airspace from Russian territory.  Meetings between 
secretaries Rice and Gates and their Russian counterparts in the fall of 2007 failed, however, to 
reach an agreement, with Rice insisting that the Russian bases serve as add-ons, not substitutes, 
to the Czech and Polish sites.  Neither Poland nor the Czech Republic for their part welcomed 
the idea of having Russian military officials permanently stationed on their bases.116 
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In informal interviews in 2008 and 2009, a number of Russians argued that the unilateral nature 
of U.S. decision-making about MD worried them most.117  The American potential for upgrading 
and re-orienting the system without Russian agreement, they asserted, poses the most direct 
threat to their national security, if not now, then under future leadership.  Some in Moscow 
expressed specific alarm at missile systems being placed close enough to the Russian border to 
permit the monitoring of Russian air space and to potentially target Russian missile silos, 
capabilities that were presumed to be achievable by Phase IV of the revised Obama plan. Russia 
also fears that the MD system will lead to American control over key defense capabilities 
(including Pershing anti-missile defenses, in addition to the interceptors) in areas it believes 
belong in its particular sphere of influence.118    
The actual extent of the future U.S. threat to Russian strategic missile bases was debatable; most 
American critics suggested that while the Bush proposed system could be expanded, it was not 
highly probable.119  Moscow’s continued, and increased, opposition to the potential MD system 
in Europe may also have backfired.  A Russia that appears implacably opposed to a U.S. 
presence near its border, and that insists on maintaining its own sphere of influence, was not to 
be defined as a partner, but rather as a hostile factor at least in geopolitical terms.  Russia’s 
military campaign in Georgia alarmed a number of former Soviet states and allies, who worried 
that recent Russian rhetoric may not be as hollow as the United States suggested.  Of even 
greater concern was Russia’s demonstrated contempt for the West, as it ignored criticism and 
linked the “climbdown” from the U.S. “virtual project” in Georgia with Washington’s need for 
Russian agreement in its more ambitious global projects.120    
2.  The Present  
What took eight years of haggling, consternation, and acrimony to establish took just a few 
months to be scrapped.  The Obama administration provided a mostly technical rationale for 
changes to the MD plan, asserting that the system as previously constituted was too expensive 
and largely unproven.  In its place, Obama approved a new system that promised to be “smarter, 
stronger, and swifter,” and involved many more countries in its coverage and potentially more 
interceptors (100+).121  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the new plan also relied more 
on existing technology. “We can now field initial elements of the system to protect our forces in 
Europe and our allies roughly six to seven years earlier than the original plan.”122  Under the new 
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plan that began in spring 2011, sea- and land-based versions of the Standard Missile-3 system 
were placed across Europe (mainly in the Mediterranean near Israel and Cyprus), “primarily as a 
precaution against possible short- and medium-range missiles launched from Iran,” now 
considered more likely than longer-ranger missiles.123  The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense report 
raised the significance of the “regionally based systems” to a status almost co-equal to that of 
homeland defense and provided a fairly clear, technical perspective on the systems proposed and 
those under eventual consideration.124  
 
Discussions on MD cooperation have grown significantly over the past 18 months in depth and 
complexity.125  At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO committed to seeking a 
cooperative solution to European missile defense (EMD), engaging NATO states and Russia in 
programs linked to the Obama Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), 
which relies on land- and sea-based deployment of Aegis missiles and the Standard Missiles 
(SM1Block 1A) in the period up to 2015 (Phases 1 and 2), on the upgraded land-based Standard 
Missiles (SM3 Block 1B) after 2015 (Phase 3), and on the SM3 Block 2 from 2018-2020 (Phase 
4).  The United States is planning to finance the development of the SM3 interceptors and key 
radars; other nations will finance their own interceptors, and NATO will fund the common 
command and control system.  An Aegis platform is already deployed in the Mediterranean, 
providing some reassurance for the states of southern Europe as well as Poland and Romania, 
which will host interceptors and radars.  The EMD decision was negotiated carefully with 
Turkey, given some concerns in Ankara and elsewhere that Turkey might pursue nuclear 
weapons in response to a nuclear Iran, but also with an eye to potential deployments of radars 
and interceptors in Turkey as well.  
At the outset, prospects for cooperation remained cloudy. Medvedev and the Russian military 
sought to posit a single integrated system with full-scale interoperability and constant oversight.  
Russia then suggested a somewhat murky “sectoral approach” that to critics and some in the 
Baltics seemed to accord Russia responsibilities for the defense of some NATO territory.  
Moscow appears to have almost abandoned this concept, given American opposition, but there 
are still occasional calls for this as a goal. 
The United States and NATO have proposed two separate MD systems in Europe – one for 
NATO territory, the other for Russia – which will operate under national/alliance rules, but 
exchange crucial early warning data and signals.  The linked radars and sensors would fuse data 
on threats as well as launches from rogue states, most especially, Iran.  In bilateral negotiations 
and those in the NRC, NATO and the United States have suggested a range of other measures 
that would function as gradually intensifying confidence building measures.  There could be an 
operational cooperation center or centers (not yet clearly financed or sited, although Moscow and 
Brussels have been mentioned) to fuse data for a common operating picture, to provide training, 
and to allow the alliance and Russian military officials to develop and practice cooperative 
procedures.  The alliance’s goals are transparency and basic interoperability.  This, it is argued, 
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will give Russia both a greater sense of strategic “comfort” and insight into NATO plans and 
procedures without allowing it to limit the development of the NATO system or indeed the 
EPAA overall.   
For Moscow, the goal still appears to involve the development of maximum inclusion and 
interoperability.  But it also seeks formal guarantees – initially a presidential statement, later 
legally binding formulations – that the United States will in the future not use this program or 
develop expanded capabilities against Russia’s strategic capabilities.126  There are also clear 
differences of opinion among three key Russian constituencies: the military, the non-military 
political bodies, and the Track-II semi-official players and think tanks.  At the moment, the 
military seems to be playing the critical role; it is clearly focused on the potential negative 
impact for the global strategic balance of a successful American move to Phase 4, when the 
Americn interceptors stationed in Europe or deployed in the United States or perhaps Asia are 
designed to have intercontinental range.  It is also still worried about the U.S. Conventional 
Prompt Global Strike systems, particularly in a worst-case analysis focused on the stipulated 
need for larger numbers to support “major regional campaigns.”127  In the military’s view, the 
EPAA deployments are just the opening stage in a campaign that future U.S. presidents may 
decide to change. 
As of February 2012, the outcome of the negotiations is not yet clear.  Regular consultations in 
Geneva, Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and elsewhere have continued but seem to be 
approaching total deadlock.  Progress has been made on the science and technology sharing 
agreements that the United States argues must precede any data or technology sharing.  The NRC 
is still planning to conduct a MD exercise in Germany in spring 2012 to which Russia is invited.  
But the domestic politics of preambles and statements on missile defense are in full bloom in 
both Washington and Moscow.  The 2012 electoral campaigns in both Russia and the United 
States take precedence.  
In my judgment and the judgment of those I’ve interviewed, progress in missile defense 
cooperation along parallel tracks between the US/NATO and Russia is a major determining 
factor in Russia’s willingness to consider further cooperative security arrangements.128  It has 
become an essential litmus test and a practical indicator of whether missile defense cooperation 
might be an alternative to complex long-duration negotiations on strategic arms control.  
Stabilized by transparency and a comprehensive membership, missile defense need not be the 
provocative technology it is sometimes characterized as, especially if full transparency and rapid 
data exchange on a credible basis are emphasized from the first stages.   
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This level of cooperation will not occur overnight, however, or without significant political 
persuasion or leadership. Some American and European conservatives still fear that the Russians 
are not collaborators, and that the system should not involve their support.  This was evident as 
many Republicans, with Senator Jon Kyl in the lead and with senator and former presidential 
candidate John McCain right behind him, expressing open dismay at the Obama administration’s 
insistence on changing the former Bush plans for the system.129  In April 2011, 39 Republican 
Senators sent a letter to the White House warning against giving the Russians a “veto” over 
American missile defense plans and expressing the opinion that sensitive data should not be 
shared with the Russians.130  Similar concerns over cooperation and data and technology 
continue be expressed by right-wing critics of the administration.  To address this opposition, the 
president needs to articulate why an approach steeped in cooperative security principles will 
benefit American security interests.   
The Russians, for their part, need to meet persistent domestic criticism of the Obama missile 
defense approach.  Leading Russian politicians, Russian hardliners, and military officials all 
assert with dismaying regularity that by phase IV (2020) or even phase III (2018) of EPAA, the 
United States will have new capability close to Russian borders that can target Russian missiles 
before their launch.  European deployments of a linked network of regional MD systems simply 
magnify the impact that American conventional superiority already provides.  They argue that 
this will be true whatever new missile technologies Russia might employ.  
 
Terrorism and Proliferation 
The loosely related policy objectives of counter-terrorism and nonproliferation demonstrate the 
strengths of cooperation in the transatlantic community and with Russia.  Both policies are core 
foreign policy objectives for these governments, with considerable popular understanding and 
support.  They also exemplify the evolution of cooperation, typifying a low-key, behind-the-
scenes approach.  The bulk of activity on these issues takes place at the bureaucratic, rather than 
the political, level.  The only time that these programs get public attention is in the event of 
major successes, such as with the August 2006 arrests of individuals planning to blow up 
transatlantic airliners, or serious failures, such as the case of Umar Abdulmutallab, who 
smuggled concealed explosives aboard a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day of 
2009.  Little activity takes place in highly visible military arenas, and indeed military action is 
far behind options emphasizing agreements to cooperate among well-trained intelligence, police, 
gendarmerie, and coastguard units.131   
1. Counter-terrorism 
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With more diffuse targets and more wide-ranging methods, counter-terrorism operations pose a 
greater challenge than nonproliferation practices.  Though there is broad political agreement on 
the need for a coherent and effective counter-terrorism policy and on some of the methods to be 
used, there is a variation in its strategic prioritization – even among countries as closely aligned 
as EU member states – which can lead to systemic shortcomings and present unique policy 
problems.  Establishing an effective cooperative security arrangement around counter-terrorism 
is likely to be difficult, but it is essential for tackling such a transnational security challenge.  
After September 11, 2001, international counter-terrorist activity was been transformed in many 
ways.  The Bush administration made the “War on Terror” the centerpiece of its foreign policy, 
tying many objectives to defeating terrorists.  The public face of the “war” was the invasion first 
of Afghanistan and then of Iraq, but the more mundane worlds of intelligence gathering and 
analysis, police work, and data sharing were also given major overhauls.  The United States 
pushed for, and obtained, agreements from a wide range of countries on defining terrorism and 
inaugurating specific cooperative actions to oppose it, including UN Security Council resolution 
1373, which became the cornerstone of the international community’s concept of terrorism and 
modernized its anti-terrorist actions.132  Most states that supported the global anti-terrorism 
agenda were U.S. friends or allies but not all, as states suspicious of the United States also saw 
the reduction of risks to state and international stability as of primary priority. 
In the years since the immediate responses to 9/11, counter-terrorism has evolved, as have 
terrorist threats.  Additional attacks in the West – in Madrid and London, as well as the July 2011 
massacre in Norway – and in Islamic nations – a long list that includes Indonesia, Turkey, 
Tunisia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia amongst many others – have revealed 
new terrorist strategies and brought home the importance of stopping them.  The successes of the 
pervasive anti-terrorism strategy are harder to quantify – activities that have been prevented 
cannot be quantified.  High-profile cases, such as the trial and conviction of a British gang that 
plotted to destroy transatlantic flights using liquid bombs, have given occasional insights into the 
nature of the battle being fought.  
The first aspect that distinguishes counter-terrorism from other forms of international 
cooperation is the sheer range of countries involved.  Individual mobility means a person raised 
in the UK can become radicalized in Pakistan before attempting an attack in the United States. 
Compounding this problem is the shortage of resources in some of the countries most troubled 
by terrorist activity.  Governments in Somalia or Yemen have scant authority to act against 
groups operating within their borders even if they are inclined to do so or amenable to consistent 
U.S. pressure to police themselves.  The United States recognizes the harmful potential of failed 
states and has proclaimed that rebuilding and developing states is vital to the national interest, 
preventing them from becoming safe harbors or recruitment spurs for terrorist organizations.  
Even in the West, multiple policies and a diversity of strategies leads to coordination problems. 
Disputes over Afghanistan troop commitments or the future of Guantanamo inmates have made 
                                                            





headlines, but other, subtler issues also cause concern, showing divides within Europe.  As  
terrorism expert Dan Byman argued, “It is far easier for a terrorist to be European than for 
government to be European.”133  Individuals can move freely across borders, as can finance for 
terrorist activity. Until recently, police forces stop too often at national boundaries, and while 
information sharing in Europe is much improved, it is unlikely to have one responsible body at 
the EU level even under Lisbon.  Groups can also distribute their networks to complement the 
variation in policy – propaganda websites will be based in countries with liberal free-speech 
laws, while bank accounts will be held, if at all, where privacy laws are tougher and financial 
oversight is looser.  Increasingly, terrorist groups have turned to informal banking networks, 
precious goods exchanges, or even smuggling as ways to transfer funds undetected.  
As nations struggle to balance civil liberties with increased security, terrorist groups will seek to 
take advantage of the discrepancies.  Policy variation manifests in other ways – the levels of 
integration and wealth of Islamic communities varies widely between the United States and 
Europe, with European Muslims on average poorer, less trustful of their government, and more 
concentrated in ethnic communities that have not integrated within the wider state.  Assimilation 
is for many not a desired option.  The majority population is similarly uninterested or even 
actively hostile.   
Though such variation in policy may cause anguish for anti-terrorism experts, it is impossible to 
agree on who has it right.  After all, there is more under consideration than simply stopping these 
attacks, and the tensions between personal freedom and national security have been cast in sharp 
relief following some of the actions taken by governments as part of the War on Terror.  Since 
determining a perfect and universal policy is impractical, policymakers must instead focus their 
attention on ensuring compatibility with other states’ systems, and ensuring that they interoperate 
to the greatest possible degree. Such was the emphasis on terrorism in foreign policy over the 
past decade that a multitude of different international institutional arrangements have 
proliferated.   
Within Europe, this has meant a greater role for the EU, through the office of the EU Counter 
Terrorism Coordinator.  With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Office of the CTC has been 
strengthened as the “pillars” system that characterized post-Maastricht Europe is eliminated, in 
the process ending the “policy silos” it created between foreign and security policy and justice 
and home affairs policy.  The “Stockholm Program” is the EU initiative for developing an area 
of “freedom, security, and justice,” addressing collective challenges including terrorism at a 
Europe-wide level.  However, the Lisbon era is still taking shape, and it is yet to be determined 
how the institutional roles will shake out.  The EU has broken its strategy down to four principal 
components:134 
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1. Prevent – The first part of the strategy aims at preventing radicalization and 
recruitment. Different member states have led different components; Spain for example, 
is leading an imam-outreach activity while Denmark heads de-radicalization efforts.  
2. Protect – This part focuses more on conventional security concerns. Improving 
the security of external borders was a major feature of the plan, since the Schengen 
Agreement allows for free movement between member states.  Attention is also being 
paid to cyber-security, securing transport networks, and ensuring explosives stocks are 
adequately protected.  
3. Pursue – The third part focuses on traditional police functions.  Data sharing is 
re-emphasized, while Europol is given a boosted institutional identity by being 
incorporated into EU structures.  Efforts are also underway to find accommodations for 
the different criminal codes across the continent.  
4. Response – The final part attends to managing and minimizing the consequences 
of an attack. Crisis response exercises promote best practice.  The EU has channeled 
funding to victim support organizations throughout its member states.  
The EU has used its foreign affairs apparatus to widen bilateral and multilateral cooperation on 
counter-terrorism with the United States, the countries of South Asia, the Maghreb and the Horn 
of Africa, India, Turkey, and Russia.  Emphasizing the role of foreign policy, development, and 
security undoubtedly has merit as a preventative counter-terrorism strategy.  However, 
cooperating on foreign policy has proven problematic in the past; national voices remain loud, 
and frequently out of harmony.  The broader and still unresolved challenge of creating a 
European foreign policy has direct implications for the counter-terrorism aspects of that 
program.  
The G8, with strong Russian support, also has new prominence in this area, establishing the 
Counter-terrorism Action Group (CTAG) at the 2003 summit in Evian, France.  It aimed to 
enhance global counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance and coordination activities and to 
reduce duplication of effort.  It invited non-G8 regulars Spain, Australia, and Switzerland to 
cooperate in its mechanisms. CTAG was particularly successful in measures to counter the 
financing of terrorism, but stalled when attempting to broaden its involvement beyond that 
aspect.  A lack of consistency due to rotating leadership and no permanent secretariat has 
combined with U.S. and British reticence to rely on using G8 capabilities.  Ultimately this has 
reduced the appeal of the organization for other members as a focus for their CT efforts.  
The Center on Global Counter-terrorism Cooperation was more upbeat in its assessment of 
Japan’s 2009 CTAG presidency, but still found much room for improvement, advocating a more 
holistic response than focusing on law enforcement and security measures.135  The G8 also set up 
the “Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” 
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channeling $10 billion-$20 billion from 2002-2012 to stop the spread of WMD.  However, it too 
struggled to overcome constrained funding and a narrow focus.136   
Unfortunately, the G8 grouping suffers because of its limited membership, as well as some of the 
troubles inherent in expanding other loose cooperative security arrangements.  It is still possible 
to gather resources at that level, although many wealthy counter-terrorism donor countries such 
as Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden are excluded.  Target 
countries, however, are also not involved in the decision making process, and their perspectives 
are rarely taken into account.  By expanding its membership, the CTAG could address some of 
these problems, but at the same time would lose the cohesion and standing it gets from being a 
G8 body; in a G8+ form, it would become just another coalition of concerned nations.   
The CTAG was formed in part in response to dissatisfaction with the far broader UN Counter 
Terrorism Committee (also usually abbreviated CTC – for clarity hereafter UNCTC). That 
committee was established to aid implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373.  
Resolution 1373 took the unprecedented step of mandating counter-terrorism action by all UN 
countries, “such as the criminalization of both terrorism and its financing…[It] recommends a 
wide series of measures in terms of international co-operation against terrorism, ranging from 
collaboration between police and intelligence services to that between judiciaries, while at the 
same time asking for the signing and ratification of the international instruments against 
terrorism that have been approved by the General Assembly.”137  
A subsequent resolution, Security Council Resolution 1540, obliged states to refrain from 
“supporting by any means non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, 
possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their 
delivery systems” and established the “1540 Committee” as a standing body to oversee it.138  The 
list of terrorism-related resolutions is lengthy (see Rupérez for a complete roster), but the impact 
of this abundance of legislating has been mixed.  
Attempts to agree on a universal definition of terrorism or to organize the oft-delayed 
Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism have foundered; too many states are still willing to 
encourage and finance terrorist activity and do not wish to see this curtailed. Other nations 
simply do not have the resources to commit to an energetic anti-terror campaign, needing to 
focus on more basic functions to improve living standards for their people.  Given the scope of 
cultural, political and economic differences that exist between UN members, more so than any 
other, less comprehensive, international body, it is perhaps unsurprising that some leading 
countries in the counter-terrorism sphere have chosen to focus their attention on more tightly 
knit, smaller membership bodies and bilateral agreements.  UN operations, though marked with 
strident rhetoric in the aftermath of a major attack, can descend into repetitive bureaucratization 
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and lose the content and impact they intend.  The creation of standing committees to oversee 
implementation has not solved this tendency.139   
Another challenge to counter-terrorism cooperation is what the EU CTC calls “CT fatigue”: with 
several years having passed since the most severe attacks on the West, in New York and 
Washington, London and Madrid, and with other events having threatened people’s livelihoods 
in other ways – the financial crisis, for instance – publics and politicians alike have less time for 
counter-terrorism work.  The CTC’s advice for dealing with this is to avoid overly repressive 
policy options, and to avoid spurts of activity in response to major attacks, and instead establish a 
realistic pace for strategies to unfold.140  The challenge with this approach is prevention: Can the 
CTC effectively prevent future terrorist attacks if it is not making counter-terrorism a constant 
priority?  
Cooperation on stopping the financing of terror groups (anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorism finance or AML/CTF) has consistently shown better results. Key institutions – the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the Financial Action Task Force – have demonstrated a “high level of 
informal cooperation,” according to the Center on Global Counter-terrorism Cooperation.141  
Those organizations’ work on “setting standards, conducting needs assessments, and helping 
build the capacity of countries through technical assistance and training programs” garnered 
particular praise.142  Nevertheless, on-going turf battles between U.S. agencies and overlapping 
work on the international stage mean more can still be achieved. 
Beyond the institutional programs, bilateral counter-terrorism agreements exist between the 
United States and many other countries.  Few countries other than the United States have sought 
out such agreements, so the bilateral model more closely resembles a hub-and-spoke 
arrangement with the United States at its center, than a network with multiple links.  
U.S.-Russian collaboration was among the strongest and certainly the most public of bilateral 
links during the Bush era.  Over the course of the subsequent decade, though, that united front 
dissipated amid other disputes between the countries, many of which are discussed elsewhere in 
this paper.  
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President Putin was the first foreign leader to speak to President 
Bush. In the week that followed, Putin pledged Russian resources and cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism.  As attention turned to Afghanistan, Russia saw the advantages of cooperation.  
After all, it had been supporting Northern Alliance fighters against the Taliban since the mid-90s, 
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fearful that after the debacle of its own occupation of the country, the Taliban would nurture and 
train Islamist insurgencies in Central Asia, including Chechnya and some of the newly 
independent “stans.”  An intergovernmental working group, the U.S.-Russia Working Group on 
Afghanistan, which had been established at a 2000 Clinton-Putin, quickly found the scope and 
importance of its activities expanded as war with Afghanistan became inevitable.  The group was 
rebranded as the Working Group on Counter-terrorism in 2002 and directed cooperation focusing 
on regions, such as the Caucasus, and issues, such as WMD terrorism.  The forum provided 
another channel for communication between the two countries, although Beene et al. find that it 
had a limited impact, mainly serving “to cushion the blow from U.S. initiatives that might 
otherwise engender a more vitriolic response from Russia.”143  
Russia saw other advantages in a closer alliance with the West on terrorism.  Its ongoing war in 
Chechnya was recast as a battle against Islamist extremism, lending it a veneer of international 
acceptability that had previous been lacking.  The Bush administration was willing to turn a blind 
eye to the re-escalation of that conflict, which had previously generated considerable 
international criticism, including from the U.S. government.  That was one of several incidents 
(the bungled Russian police raid on a hostage-taking incident at a Moscow theater in October 
2002, and the spate of assassinations throughout Russia’s want-away southern provinces being 
others) that highlighted one of the major concerns with the brand of cooperation Bush and Putin 
had chosen to operate.  When used as cover for government crackdowns, no matter how 
tangentially related to the counter-terrorism objective, the entire counter-terrorism strategy could 
be delegitimized.  The United States faced its own loss of core legitimacy with later acts, 
including the invasion of Iraq, the torture scenarios from Abu Ghraib to Guantanamo, the 
agreements on extraordinary rendition, and the often-sloppy watch lists of “terrorist” individuals 
and organizations.  But it also suffered a diplomatic backlash against the acts committed by other 
countries in the name of its strategy.  
Bilateral arrangements also are seen to have more direct, immediate operational benefits. 
Cooperation between France and the United States has reached new heights since 9/11, with 
intelligence sharing being the leading operational benefit.  France’s elite counter-terrorism forces 
(heralded as “the most effective in the world” by as unlikely a source as the conservative 
American Enterprise Institute) have been able to give U.S. analysts a better insight into Islamist 
threats emanating from the Maghreb and the Middle East.144  Despite the bitter acrimony over 
the Iraq war, lower-level interactions between intelligence officials proceeded apace – it was not 
by chance that the CIA and FBI headquartered their European counterterrorist liaison in Paris. 
French investigators – under fewer legal constraints than their U.S. counterparts even after the 
enactment of the Patriot Act – have greater capacity for sweeping and intrusive surveillance.  In 
the form of the juges d’instruction system, powers are also combined, assigned to powerful 
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individuals given abilities of prevention, deterrence, and punishment.145  Cooperating in this way 
allows countries to make the best of other nations’ laws, taking advantage of the differences 
between jurisdictions to get the best out of all systems.  
 2.  Nonproliferation  
Nuclear nonproliferation, originally a more expansive strategic priority, has become emblematic 
of counter-terrorism.  The largest fear for global security is not that a rogue state will possess 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but rather that a terrorist organization will.  Thus, 
cultivating a responsible, cooperative approach to preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and keeping them out of terrorist hands has become a central priority.  
The Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) may be the most expansive 
implementation of this approach. Coordination and a diffuse cooperative system of intelligence 
sharing and action were primary features of PSI.146  It is not a formal system, but rather, a series 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements.  The Obama team seems willing, at least for now, to 
continue this “coalition of the willing” approach and to give precedence to intra-team 
transparency and progressive ad hoc agreements on case-specific actions over formal 
institutionalization and bureaucratic rule-making.  This approach gives credence and credibility 
to Obama’s overall approach of cooperative security in counter-terrorism: cooperation is needed, 
but on a case-by-case basis, rather than in broad strokes.  
PSI reflects a broad transatlantic consensus on both principle and operations.  Its goal is to stop 
the transport, at sea, of materials and components that facilitate WMD proliferation. Even though 
PSI has no formal treaty, the majority of the NATO allies and littoral Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
countries are public adherents or unannounced supporters.  A number have taken leadership roles 
in some of the more public exercises or actual incidences – Spain, Italy, Germany, France, 
Poland, and the UK, in addition to the United States.  The United States has been most active in 
pushing this non-institutionalized, non-treaty based activity to its limits.  It has signed 
agreements with all of the flagging (registry) states to ease boarding inspections on the high seas, 
away from territorial waters.  It has pushed new technologies and techniques, often in 
conjunction with domestic Department of Homeland Security programs.  It has pushed for 
increasing transparency and common operational pictures, to ensure timely interdiction and the 
“creative” use of national regulations to ensnare cargoes and ships (the “broken headlight” 
scenario, where lesser violations are used to justify searches that may turn up evidence of serious 
proliferation activity).  In the Bush doctrine, the need for continuous real-time surveillance 
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trumped many established rights including the right of privacy of communication and the usual 
evidentiary requirements.  Where this national security need collided with the U.S. constitution, 
the tasks were simply outsourced to willing partners in position to act.  
As Andrew Winner explains, “At its core, the PSI is a coalition of the willing with the potential 
for participants to vary the degrees of their commitment and participation.”147  At the deep end of 
commitment, countries have signed up to the terms of a brief “Statement of Interdiction 
Principles,” with other countries agreeing to decreasing circles of commitment. Russia, but not 
China, have publicly agreed to support the PSI. 
Yet, the initiative has its problems. The Congressional Research Service found the levels of 
involvement of most of the 70 countries that “support” the PSI to be “unclear.”148  There is no 
“organization,” in any conventional sense.  It has no secretariat, no headquarters, and no annual 
dedicated budget.  The Statement of Principles lacks the enforcement rules, or indeed any 
specified obligations, that are characteristic of “normal” treaties.  Still, it is more developed than 
being a set of bilateral agreements between the United States and partners.  Without these 
formalities, and with the secretive nature of the work carried out under PSI, it is also hard to 
assess the success of the program.  
With continued support from the Obama administration, PSI seems to be succeeding.  The use of 
bilateral agreements allows American partners to act in circumstances where the United States 
cannot, such as boarding ships in international waters and searching for weapons.  It also 
provides a certain level of cohesion; the PSI is a network of bilateral agreements, providing the 
interdependence necessary for an effective cooperative security arrangement.  There are hubs 
and spokes, but the spokes connect.  In essence, it is effective because each participating state 
recognizes that it is in its interest to act cooperatively.  
The main lesson to be drawn from counter-terrorism cooperation is to “look at the work, not at 
the headlines.”149  States are engaged in extensive cooperation at multiple levels, and through 
different institutional frameworks.  At times, this abundance of work leads to overlap, 
redundancy, or waste.  At others, it most closely resembles a “coalition of the willing,” when the 
participation of the unwilling is most critical.  The conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and 
Iraq have all claimed more capabilities than are easily at hand and have produced a series of 
dramatic failures resulting in lost lives and status.  And the 2011 capture of Osama bin Laden, 
only miles from an elite Pakistani military school speaks for itself. 
Yet considering that many of the processes for conducting counter-terrorism cooperation have 
been around for less than a decade, the overall performance must be considered reasonably 
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positive.  The final judgment will still be whether cooperation prevents more attacks than would 
be expected through national efforts alone.  Some hair’s-breadth escapes in 2009 (the attack on 
the Milanese barracks, the arrest of a scientist at CERN, the failure of the Christmas Day bomb 
plot) make it clear that there is no room for complacency.150  The investigations into the latter 
attempt have uncovered failures in information-sharing, but as always, vague connections appear 
much clearer in hindsight than before an event.  
Traditional elements of cooperative security are increasingly part of the international counter-
terrorism strategy.  Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, as well as a number of administration figures, 
have repeatedly proposed extending and expanding the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative 
(CTR, or as more popularly named, the Nunn-Lugar Program) to encompass new geographical 
areas, as well as new types of activities.151  As part of this shift, Russia and Europe would need 
to adopt a more active and expanded role as participants, monitors, funders, regulators, and 
governors.  This expanded initiative’s goal would be to build on Nunn-Lugar programs and 
create a worldwide monitoring and oversight capability that is perhaps governed by a coalition of 
the willing, but ultimately anchored by these three poles. 
This proposal has many backers and a number of true admirers.  CTR is viewed as one of the 
major successes of the post-Cold War era, and has been an interesting and rich source of 
cooperative work, continuing complex interactions at the individual level, and occasionally a 
test-bed for policy ideas and experiments.  The initiative has bloomed and expanded, and has 
created several political and diplomatic, if not military and scientific breakthroughs.  As with the 
CFE Treaty, the inspection and verification experience has led to unexpected insights and 
generated substantial data about the effects and consequences of the verification choices that 
have increasingly replaced the ideologies of the past.  Some in Congress view the program as too 
favorable to the Russians; the CTR program twice almost did not receive congressional approval 
or funding.  Indeed, there are a number of striking examples of how bureaucracies, when 
determined, can and did thwart implementation of programs (e.g. the long U.S.-EU stalemate 
over funding the Science Centers, the “surplus” facilities that were constructed and never used, 
and questions of espionage and inadequate political oversight). 
Yet, the program is relatively inexpensive given its results, which can be generalized on several 
different levels.  It is an instrument in hand, waiting for resources and leadership.  As it moves 
forward, its principal emphasis should be on the cooperative activities themselves and the 
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All of the recent controversies surrounding energy issues, especially natural gas distribution in 
Europe, suggest that ensuring energy security should be a natural venue for cooperative 
solutions.  Europe’s balance of power, however, has made it difficult to identify widely accepted 
solutions or even to find suitable methods of working together.  The impulse to securitize energy 
supply in politics, east to west, is strong given the persistence of distribution networks largely 
built first during the Cold War.  The absence of short-term, market-driven solutions makes a 
cooperative intergovernmental arrangement the next best option to achieve a more stable 
outcome with serious concern for the differing equities of consumers, suppliers, and transit 
countries.  Such a set up could regularize contacts and information exchanges on energy 
concerns, lead to the establishment of a mutually acceptable and impartial dispute-settlement 
mechanism, and help pave the way for the modernization of both infrastructure and market 
structures.  
The likelihood of this outcome appears slim, however.  While there have been some 
improvement after the energy supply shocks of the decade of the 21st century, the energy 
relationships between Europe and Russia still show strain and short-term turbulence. Russia’s 
energy wealth has been key to its economic revitalization and its ability to reassert power in the 
region.  Indeed, Russia supplies 31 percent of the natural gas consumed in the EU, and this figure 
is projected to rise to 50-60 percent within the next two decades.152  EU countries also meet a 
quarter of their oil needs and a third of their uranium needs with Russian imports, although these 
markets are characterized by greater international competition than the natural gas sector.  Rising 
European demand for gas, driven by both economic growth and a desire to switch away from 
more carbon-intensive sources of electricity generation (predominantly coal), put ever-greater 
pressures on these energy relationships.  This level of dependency gives Russia substantial 
leverage and has led to considerable unease among European policymakers.  Several 
developments – the most problematic being the gas-supply shutoffs that have become a staple of 
European winters over the last decade, Russia’s hostility toward Western companies operating 
“its” resources, and Russia’s ravenous accumulation of downstream assets across the continent – 
have led to calls for a less confrontational way of doing business.  
1. The Energy Charter Treaty: Demise by Negotiation 
It is not for lack of cooperative designs in this area.  As far back as 1991, Europeans attempted to 
tighten cooperation in this area.  The Energy Charter (which led, in 1994, to the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT)) laid out principles that were intended to guide countries’ policies and establish a 
code of conduct.  The ECT’s initial intent was the integration of former Soviet and Eastern 
European countries’ energy sectors into the broader European market following the end of the 
Cold War.  Its objectives fall into four areas: protecting foreign investments; establishing non-
discriminatory conditions for trading energy products; environmental and energy efficiency 
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measures; and a dispute resolution system.  These amount to an approximate trade of Western 
finance and technology for eastern oil and gas.  
Its early days were marked by positive rhetoric – of “a new paradigm for trade in energy.”153  
With the former Soviet republics collapsed and desperate, and with Russia at its lowest historical 
ebb, the desire to incentivize investment in the lucrative but run-down energy resource sectors 
was abundant.  Western Europe, meanwhile, was eager to diversify its oil supply base away from 
the Middle East, and to begin the process of stabilizing and acculturating its eastern neighbors to 
the post-Cold War world.  These reciprocal interests provided a strong basis for energy 
cooperation within the region.  
 
The role of Russia – the biggest energy supplier in the region and the catalyst for any truly 
effective energy cooperation – has so far been the biggest obstacle facing the ECT.  Although 
President Yeltsin supported the treaty and its objectives, many nationalist hardliners in the 
Russian parliament objected to it, decrying it as “a ploy of the West...to exploit and control 
Russia.”154  Ratification was delayed for several years before Vladimir Putin assumed the 
presidency, at which point support for ratification from the Kremlin was withdrawn.  
The period of Yeltsin’s leadership saw the Russian economy suffer a series of travails, with its 
currency devalued, its people impoverished and starving, and its industries in severe decline.  
When Putin became president, revitalizing the economy and the nation was his primary 
objective.  Energy presented the means by which that would be accomplished.  Utilizing the 
monopoly power inherent in the gas pipeline networks, consolidating that power in Gazprom, 
and firmly tying Kremlin policy to Gazprom action, Putin rejected the “quid pro quo” implicit in 
the ECT structure.  Western investment would bring nothing Russia could not provide for 
herself, and would take the proceeds of Russia’s resource bounty away from her people.  Putin’s 
nationalistic alternative would use oil and gas money to pay for public services, modernization 
and investment.  Gazprom was the revenue stream that made this possible.  
  
In 2000, work began on an addition to the ECT, known as the Transit Protocol.  The objective of 
the Protocol was to make access to transit pipelines non-discriminatory – accessible equally by 
all firms, foreign and domestic, at fair prices.  Though appealing in an EU context, where 
unbundling and market liberalization were still a key focus of policymaking, to Russia the 
Transit Protocol was a disaster.  In a stroke, it would obliterate Gazprom’s monopoly, its rent 
source, and with it, the source of so much of the government’s income.  If Putin disliked the ECT 
before, now it became untenable. Russia has since shown no indication of an interest in the ECT.  
There is no reason to assume the ECT or anything close to it will be brought back to life in 
Putin’s second period as Russian president.155 
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The controversy surrounding the Protocol made it clear that decisions within the signatory 
nations were no longer being made cooperatively, with agreement from all involved parties (if 
indeed they ever were).  In other words, the cooperative movement that existed in 2000 was 
smaller than its 1991 version, with arguably more closely aligned values, but without the breadth 
of membership to be useful to resolve conflict and confrontation in the energy sector.  
  
Signatories to the Energy Charter Treaty (green) and observers (blue). Russia and Norway signed but did 
not ratify. 
 Source: Energy Charter Secretariat 
The international energy community features other international organizations, though neither of 
the most prominent could reasonably be described as cooperative in constitution or intent.  The 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) looks out for the interests of oil 
producers.  The International Energy Agency (IEA) was established in an attempt to counter 
OPEC’s influence by coordinating the policies of the “consumers” – the members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  In the 1970s – a decade of oil 
shocks, embargoes, and hours-long gas lines – the relationship between the two bodies was 
entirely and deliberately confrontational. OPEC – in part trying to maximize the economic 
returns on its resources, and in part trying to punish the West for broader foreign policy reasons, 
especially Western support for Israel – had little interest in compromise.  The relationship 
between the organizations has fortunately avoided returning to this type of competition, as 
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OPEC’s influence has been steadily diminished by infighting and changed market conditions.  
NATO has dallied with the idea of encouraging energy cooperation but been hampered by the 
view of many, especially in Europe, that this would only lead to greater “securitization.”156 
In the commercial world, these changed market conditions mean more for cooperation than any 
number of institutional contrivances.  As oil moved from being mainly traded on long-term fixed 
contracts to a spot market, the politicization of the business decreased.  The continuing 
difficulties in Europe’s gas market derive, at least in part, from the inability of the gas industry, 
dependent as it is on pipelines and long-term contracts, to move to a more flexible structure.  
Increasing their reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) is one longer-term method that European 
consumers could employ to reduce their dependence on the political whims of a handful of 
critical suppliers.  The shale gas alternative (the “tsunami” in the word of Daniel Yergin) that has 
significantly expanded the global market and lowered unit prices faces major barriers because of 
its damage to the environment and uncertain production potential in the two major locations, 
Poland and France. 
2. Where next for energy cooperation?  
Cooperative approaches are only likely to yield successful outcomes if there is some compatible 
interest that joins the parties involved.  The Eurasian energy sector, of late, has not shown much 
in the way of mutual understanding, and has at times appeared riven with competition even 
among members of the EU.  However, a few basic interests underlie the actions of supplier, 
transit, and consumer countries alike, around which a cooperative arrangement could coalesce.  
  
Energy (predominantly gas) supply cutoffs have become a staple of European winters.  Gas 
supplies to Ukraine were cut in January 2006, March 2008, and January 2009, while oil supplies 
to Belarus were stopped in January 2007.  Repeat closures of Belarusian supply lines in summer 
2010 were resolved more rapidly and caused little disruption downstream at a time of low 
consumption.   
Shutoffs and short-time disruption of east-to-west supply of gas have a widespread and painful 
impact, as recently as in the winter of 2012.  When supplies to Ukraine are cut, gas ostensibly 
intended for EU customers is still put into Ukrainian pipeline systems for transit.  However, 
facing domestic shortfalls, the Ukrainian gas supply company has on numerous occasions topped 
up its own supplies from the volumes intended for more Westerly customers, shrinking the 
amounts sent on.  This practice reduces the volumes of fuel that reach CEE nations, such as 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.  Short on fuel, high-consuming industrial users have 
been forced to close, shutting thousands out of work, while citizens face winter conditions in 
their homes.  Ukraine has suffered tremendously from these cutoffs, both in terms of the damage 
to its domestic customers, and the damage done to its reputation as a reliable transit source.  
Recent Ukrainian political leaders are more attuned to making Russia-friendly deals and to 
implementing stricter measures against theft and diversion.  But this has also meant higher fuel 
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prices at a time of fiscal shortfalls and lower prospects for the prosperity that independence 
seemed to offer.  And because there is no available mechanism to resolve or even illuminate the 
cause for this turbulence, suspicions of manipulation and malfeasance abound.157 
Europe is looking closely at alternative supply routes, with Nordstream, a pipeline through the 
Baltic already under joint Russian-German patronage now open, and a pair of proposals for 
routes through Turkey on the drawing board (Nabucco and Sudstream) that would reduce the 
leverage Poland and Ukraine have sometimes exercised, and the transit fees they can charge.  
The northern route also reduces the transit fees that have sustained Baltic energy purchases and 
Polish influence over the trade volume. 
Though Russia is usually portrayed as a calculating, Machiavellian schemer, who uses shutoffs 
to pressure neighbors like Ukraine and Belarus and to gouge higher prices out of Western 
consumers, it has much to lose from the repeated use of these tactics.  It faces the prospect of 
future competition.  If it can resolve its funding difficulties, the Nabucco pipeline (officially 
favored by the EU and informally by the US) may in time offer not only a new transit route, but 
also potentially new supply sources for fuel, hooking Europe up to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
and undermining Russia’s monopoly position.  Russia is also not paid when gas is not sold. For a 
country as dependent on energy sales as Russia, low sales or increasing domestic demand for a 
week as was true in the Janaury 2012 cold snap can be troubling for major state budgetary items. 
Finally, Russian usual domestic demand for energy has increased exponentially, along with a 
popular unwillingness to sacrifice personal prosperity and comfort for state purposes.158  
Europe’s energy interests are converging on other fronts as well.  The Energy Charter Treaty and 
the many Russian alternatives suggested are all dead, held up at their core by questions about the 
strategic role of Gazprom in the Russian state.  But the financial crisis has focused minds 
enormously and until recently, much of the explosive rhetoric has been underplayed or replaced 
with new talk of cooperation and “communities of fate.”  With Russian firms (Gazprom, in 
particular) looking to make investments in downstream assets in the EU, the potential for a 
symmetric exchange of strategic interests may be viable.  Such a plan would require a level of 
unity not previously displayed by EU members, as they would need to avoid undercutting each 
other in exchange for supply contracts and stand firm for a more equitable deal.  
This point gets to the heart of the difficulty in arranging a wide-reaching, cooperative energy 
security system among suppliers, transit countries, and customers in Europe and Eurasia.  
Attempts to assemble a coordinated policy between members of the European Union – a group 
of countries with ostensibly compatible values and interests – have been underwhelming.  EU 
nations have only formed a semblance of a common energy policy, one that is riddled with 
inconsistencies.  Internal market liberalization – long the sole focus of the European 
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Commission’s efforts at consolidation – remains largely unfulfilled, despite a gamut of directives 
and outright threats from the competition commissioner.  Agreement was finally reached in early 
2009 on the need for a joint external policy, with the Parliament passing the recommendations of 
the 2008 Second Strategic Review (SSR) on energy policy.159  It is too early, even in 2012, to tell 
what, if any, impact this new policy will have, as much of its focus is long-term, and 
implementation moves slowly.  On paper, it addresses the concerns about Europe’s previous 
failure to “speak with one voice” on energy matters.  However, different member states have 
different approaches to and different demands of the relationship with Moscow, and the policy 
does not clarify with whose voice Europe speaks.  If and when the EU countries decide what it is 
they agree on, they can work with Russia with a clear sense of what their objectives and 
priorities are, and what they cannot tolerate.  
This paper does not attempt to determine the precise outline or outcome of a cooperative 
arrangement.  Russian and European parties must determine their shared interests, especially 
those that are not immediately apparent in the absence of talks and transparent motives. Given 
the dismal state of energy diplomacy and its failures in winters past, any outcome will be better 
than the ad hoc firefighting currently being attempted.  However, to be successful, a cooperative 
energy regime should have certain characteristics.  Given the emphasis on improving the 
information available to both parties, transparency should be the focal point.  Transparency in 
action is critical for mutual reassurance – to let both parties know that their counterparts are 
negotiating honestly and delivering on their promises.  Transparency of motives is also 
important, as it will help diplomats on both sides figure out what policies the traffic will bear.  
There have been some cooperative start-ups across the energy sector already; these need to be 
expanded and deepend to allow the building of mutual trust, and confidence against sudden 
change or political mandates.  As recently catalogued, there is a wide range of opportunities:  
 Exploration of steps needed to permit synchronous interconnections for electricity trades, 
 Nuclear power safety projects and “energy bridges” to compare best practices, 
 Renewed, self-correcting infrastructure cooperation, across pipelines, high-voltage lines, 
underground gas storage, LNG terminals, and liquefaction plants, 
 Cooperation and transparency in methods and models to improve simulation, prediction and 
control of supply and demand.160  
Other mechanisms can provide similar reassurance to members of a cooperative forum – 
including stand-alone forums; those subsumed under a broader Eurasian forum; or even 
groupings pursued in public pronouncements and interlocking bilateral arrangements. For 
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instance, veto provisions will keep the pace of negotiations from exceeding what any participant 
is willing to stomach, and avoid the “railroading” of the preferred policies of big players against 
the wishes of smaller nations.  
It is clear that there may soon be another test of the ability of Europe, Russia, and the United 
States to design cooperative, persistent, and peaceful sharing solutions.  In the view of several 
observers, the Artic under climate change could become the next tempting location for energy 
exploration.161  It could be both a challenge and an opportunity simultaneously. And there are in 
place weak but reinforceable institutions to foster and develop cooperative solutions.162 There 
must be attention to the competing market structures involved, and the need to find ways not just 
to harmonize but to foster the identification of converging national interests, toward sharing both 
risk and benefit in the energy area as in other domains. 
The discourse surrounding energy policy, particularly in Europe, increasingly resembles that of 
arms control.  Talk of the use of “the energy weapon,” of MAD (in this instance “mutually 
assured dependence”), and of the balance of power exemplifies the trend.163  Energy cutoffs are 
the big threat, the surprise attack, in this way of thinking. And the methods that were brought to 
bear to reduce tensions in the nuclear weapons sphere are appropriate for Europe’s increasingly 
fractious energy relations.  Cooperative methods, reasonably applied to willing participants, 
could yield positive results. Even if the outcomes are not optimal, the process of dialogue can 
help ease tensions and increase mutual understanding.  Both Europe and Russia should make a 
commitment to keep talking, with the United States taking a far more active supporting role than 
simply holding everyone’s coat.  After all, that is better than the alternative.  
 
V. Future Prospects and Recommendations  
Reviewing the excitable tone of some of the early cooperative security literature, it is 
understandable why some have become disenchanted with the concept.  Sold, in some quarters, 
as the definitive and relatively easy post-Cold War security structure, as the ideal way to manage 
relations between a multitude of nations and regional groupings of varying size and power, it 
could never have lived up to expectations.  Neither it, nor anything else, could solve all the 
world’s problems by itself.  However, just because it may have been advertised overeagerly does 
not mean that its applications to date have failed, nor does it leave CS absent a role to play in the 
future.  
This paper has looked at five different security challenges and the role CS can play in managing 
them. CS cannot solve them all, but it arguably has a significant part to play in helping manage 
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the risks inherent to them all, in allocating tasks among nations committed to tackling the 
problems, and in coordinating activity throughout the international community.  
At its core, the idea of CS is to create stakeholders who despite differences and perhaps reasons 
for suspicion recognize common or convergent interest in behaving differently toward each other 
to achieve a share-able gain.  Broadening the range of countries who are both concerned about a 
particular issue and prepared to engage in some action to prevent, mitigate, or resolve it, 
increases the likelihood of a successful outcome.  By linking intentions, countries tend toward 
closer collaboration on actions.  By acting jointly, countries align their objectives.  By acting 
transparently, states set the conditions for both stability (back to “no surprises”) and set 
precedents for similar acts in other areas. 
This paper has shown that the merits of cooperative security can be applied to a wide range of 
problems.  It has made recommendations specific to each of these problems in the relevant 
sections.  These recommendations fall into several themes, which are recounted here:  
 Information sharing – Across the board, increasing information sharing and 
overall transparency are the simplest means of achieving an improved cooperative 
security environment.  In some cases, such as counter-terrorism, it is the only way that 
the widespread and varied efforts to tackle the problem can gain any sense of coherence.  
It avoids unnecessary duplication of efforts, while at the same time allowing 
international partnerships to identify unfilled gaps.  In some areas, particularly those 
accustomed to operating at the highest levels of official secrecy (parts of the military 
and the nuclear complex are two examples that spring to mind), a cultural resistance to 
information sharing can be expected.  It is in these areas that high-level leadership ought 
to apply pressure to the bureaucracies, proving the importance of information sharing at 
the strategic level.  
Proposed applications include, for instance, arrangements to rapidly share intelligence 
on “homeland defense” paramilitaries in disputed territories in Eastern Europe, or on 
terrorist activity in Europe and the Middle East.  Information sharing is one of the routes 
to resolving the dispute over missile defense, ensuring that Russian- and American-
gathered data and resources from radar installations allows for the greatest protection 
against nuclear attack from any rogue states.  Implementing the data-exchange 
mechanisms between Moscow, Brussels, and Washington is an obvious first step.  
NATO’s “Smart Defense” initiative, announced by Secrety General Rasmussen in 
February 2012, could spur cooperative efforts.  The concept seeks to allow NATO 
partners to “do more with less” by encouraging the “pooling and sharing of resources,” 
setting shared priorities, and coordinating efforts.  Transparency and accountability are 
obviously key.  Defense Ministers from several NATO countries, including the United 
Kingdom, Norway, and the Czech Republic, have spoken positively about the idea. 
 Development of institutions – At the opposite end of the scale, few methods are 
more demanding than institutionalization.  Even when it was in vogue – and no 




or organization to advance the final communiqué – locating niches, maintaining 
momentum, and finding resources have always posed obstacles.  Nevertheless, when 
done right, for reasons of genuine cooperative interest and not just to be seen to be 
doing something rather than actually doing it, developing well-organized international 
bodies can be critical for achieving a given policy objective.  Examples are varied, from 
the breadth (both of membership and of focus) of the OSCE to highly specialized bodies 
such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
Such institutions could be implemented, for example, in the sphere of arms control, by 
linking together requirements and procedures from the various substantive regimes in 
and around Europe in an overarching framework with the goal of achieving greater 
predictability and stability.  This would not prohibit links and unstructured interactions 
with other more global arrangements (e.g. the work of the IAEA), but it would give 
priority to “actionability” and to familiarity within existing expert communities and the 
politically responsible.  A greater degree of interaction between existing institutions 
could also be beneficial.  The West loses little by recognizing the reality of the CSTO 
and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, loose as they are, and the value of 
ensuring that communication occurs far exceeds the cost.  
 Sharing of best practices – The range of experiences that different bodies have 
had with the challenges highlighted in this paper means that there is a wealth of 
knowledge on which methods work and which do not.  Unfortunately, there has been 
little emphasis on disseminating this knowledge, so as to avoid replicating the failures 
and learning from the achievements.  
Examples of such activities might be launching joint training exercises and exchanges; 
establishing a greater understanding of IT use in achieving confidence building 
measures for arms control purposes; and establishing a catalog of responses for given 
contingencies and crises, allowing observers and colleagues to avoid misunderstandings 
about actions being undertaken. 
 Openness to broad participation – Among the biggest obstacle to greater 
cooperation is ingrained and outdated thinking at all levels about who can be cooperated 
with.  This thinking comes from a variety of sources, including the demands of domestic 
politics. In principle, this obstacle is easy to resolve and demands no official resources 
or particular actions.  Yet, in practice, it is harder to engender than policy change.  
Several issues and regions clearly require greater openness to broader cooperation, 
including cooperating with Russia on energy or working with Mideast countries on 
counter-terrorism where international relations are already frosty or antagonistic.  It is 
only by setting aside or working through such differences that mutually acceptable 
solutions that reduce hostility can be found. 
 Rethinking strategic interest – This paper’s final recommendation is somewhat 
counterintuitive.  After all, many of the most successful applications of cooperative 




exercise, between civil servants sharing data, or even politicians gaining trust in and 
respect for their opposite numbers.  Yet, the uppermost echelons of leadership need to 
have a sense of the strategic imperatives of cooperative security to ensure that 
cooperation is something more than a temporary, pragmatic option.  
For the United States and Russia, a renewal will require a new political calculus about 
status and advantage, about trade-offs between short-term hype and long-term 
advantage.  Action-reaction sequences extract heavy costs and often exacerbate 
problems in ways that sometimes are irreversible.  What is at stake, once again, is a new 
understanding of international relations, doing away with much of the traditional 
distinctions of allies and enemies.  
It is also true that style often confirms substance and can advance it, particularly in a globe 
grown smaller and more interconnected than before.  New threats, such as cyber-security for the 
public and private sectors, call out for new solutions based on new technologies but existing 
principles.  New emergencies beyond the capabilities of any single state—failed states, cross-
border terror networks, climate change, to name just three—suggest that without cooperation, 
even partial solutions will be less than what is needed.  
Cooperative security is an ongoing process, not a point solution or a unidirectional, omniscient 
strategy.  Monnet’s philosophy of narrowing gaps by doing, of creating overlaps and overloads 
that drive toward cooperative solutions, remains as illuminating about how to proceed as it was 
in the creation of a cooperative, stable, and eventually peaceful Western Europe.  There are often 
reversals or partial victories – view the trash heaps of failed European institutions of the 1950s 
and the 1960s and even a few from the 1990s.  But there are always other ways, and other paths 
that lead in essence to the same results. Time and persistent engagement are required to take up 
the challenges and try again.  
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Appendix 1: International Organization Membership in the 
Euro-Atlantic Space 
  
Membership by organization  























































































































































United Kingdom  






































Membership by country   
Country NATO EU OSCE Council 
of Europe
CIS CSTO SCO 
Albania Member   Member Member       




Armenia Partner   Member Member Member Member   
Austria Partner Member since 
1995 
Member Member       
Azerbaijan Partner   Member Member Member     
Belarus Partner    Member   Member Member Dialogue 
partner 
Belgium Member Member since 
founding 
Member Member       
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Partner    Member Member       
Bulgaria Member Member since 
2007 
Member Member       
Canada Member N/A Member         
China             Member 
Croatia Member Candidate for 
membership 
Member Member       
Cyprus   Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Czech Republic Member Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Denmark Member Member since 
1973 
Member Member       
Estonia Member  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Finland Partner  Member since 
1995 
Member Member       
France Member  Member since 
founding 






Partner  Candidate for 
membership 
Member Member       
Georgia Partner    Member Member       
Germany Member  Member since 
founding 
Member Member       
Greece Member  Member since 
1981 
Member Member       
Holy See     Member         
Hungary Member  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Iceland Member  Not member, 
but may be fast-
tracked 
following 






Ireland Partner  Member since 
1973 
Member Member       
Italy Member  Member since 
founding 
Member Member       
Kazakhstan Partner    Member   Member Member Member 
Kyrgyzstan Partner    Member   Member Member Member 
Latvia Member  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Liechtenstein   EFTA Member 
only 
Member Member       
Lithuania Member  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Luxembourg Member  Member since 
founding 
Member Member       
Malta Partner  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Moldova Partner    Member Member Member     
Monaco     Member Member       
Montenegro Partner  Candidate Member Member       
Netherlands Member  Member since 
founding 
Member Member       
Norway Member  EFTA member 
only 
Member Member       
Poland Member  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Portugal Member  Member since 
1986 
Member Member       
Romania Member  Member since 
2007 
Member Member       
Russia Partner    Member Member Member Member Member 
San Marino     Member Member       
Serbia Partner    Member Member       
Slovakia Member  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Slovenia Member  Member since 
2004 
Member Member       
Spain Member  Member since 
1986 
Member Member       
Sweden Partner  Member since 
1995 
Member Member       
Switzerland Partner  EFTA member 
only 
Member Member       




Turkey Member  Candidate for 
membership 
Member Member       
Turkmenistan Partner    Member   Unofficial 
associate 
member 
    




    
United Kingdom Member  Member since 
1973 
Member Member       
United States Member  N/A Member         






Appendix 2: Cooperative Security Treaties and Other 
Arrangements 
European Cooperation  
  Date 
Effective 






12 Established the European Union strengthened 
the democratic legitimacy of the institutions; 
improved the effectiveness of the institutions; 
established economic and monetary union; 
developed the Community social dimension; 
established a common foreign security policy 
Replaced by 
the Treaty 
of Lisbon  
Treaty  
Lisbon Treaty2 December 1, 
2009 
27 Provides a more transparent and democratic 
EU. Establishes a President of the European 
Council and makes binding the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights  






July 3, 1973 35  Started dialogue and cooperation with European 
states on defense, and conflict prevention. 








35  Continued the dialogue from CSCE. Focused 
on establishing norms for settling territory 









1976  1  Effort by the U.S. to monitor and work in 
coordination for policy with the OSCE. 
Commission is made up of 9 Senators, 9 
Representatives and 1 rep. each from Defense, 
State and Commerce.  
Active  Unilateral  
Charter of Paris6  November, 
1990  
34 Established guidelines and procedures that 
helped establish a stronger OSCE. Stressed 
Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law 





1995 56 Primary instrument for early warning, conflict 
prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation in its area. Focused on Human 
Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law. Replaced 
the CSCE.  





56 Reinforced conflict prevention. Allowed for the 
exchange and verification of military 
information between participating states.  




May 5, 1949 47 Emphasis on legal standards, human rights, 
democratic development, the rule of law and 
cultural co-operation. Council includes 
Committees of Minister, a Parliament, 
Secretary General, and a Court on Human 
Rights  
Active  Treaty  




Treaty10  creating a level playing field of rules to be 
observed by all participating governments, 
thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-
related investment and trade. Russia has failed 
to ratify  
Arms Control in Europe 
  Date 
Effective 






22 Is a partnership formed individually between 
each Partner country and NATO, tailored to 
individual needs and jointly implemented at 
the level and pace chosen by each 
participating government. It allows further 
cooperation between NATO and non-NATO 
states. It also is a requirement for states 
seeking to join NATO.  
Active, with 22 
current members 









34 Limited the conventional armaments of 
Russian and NATO forces. States were 
limited to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 ACVs, 
20,000 heavy artillery pieces, 6,800 combat 















34 Enforces the measures set by CFE and 
restricted U.S. forces to 250,000. Allowed 











34 Focused on states instead of blocs for 
reductions. Called for Russian withdrawal 
from Moldova and Georgia.  
NATO and 






Forces Treaty  
December 
8, 1987 
2 Eliminated nuclear and conventional 
ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles 
with intermediate ranges, defined as 
between 500-5,500 km (300-3,400 miles). 
Completed by 










34 Permits each state-party to conduct short-
notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over 
the others' entire territories to collect data on 
military forces and activities. 





27, 1991  
2 Eliminates U.S. and Russian short and 
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and 
surface ships.  





27, 1991  
7 Provides monetary and technical assistance 
from the U.S. to Russia and former Soviet 
states to secure, protect, and eliminate 
WMD facilities and delivery systems.  
Active, renewed 










5 Engaged Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
in eliminating the USSR nuclear forces on 
their soil and forswear nuclear weapons in 
the future.  
Active  Agreement  
Selected Global Arms Control Treaties 
  Date 
Effective 






103  Seeks to limit inhuman weapons in war. 
Outlaws certain types of weapons. It 
lacks verification and enforcement 
mechanisms and spells out no formal 
process for resolving compliance 
concerns. 




April, 1987  34 Urges its voluntary aims to limit the 
spread of ballistic missiles and other 
unmanned delivery systems that could 
be used for chemical, biological, and 
nuclear attacks. 
Active  Agreement  
Strategic Arms 






2 Limited states to 6,000 deployed 
strategic warheads and 1,600 delivery 
vehicles. Follow on limited to 3,000-
3,500 strategic warheads. Established a 
robust verification regime.  
Expired December 
9, 2009. Followed 





July, 1996  40 Information exchange export control 
regime where members exchange 
information on transfers of 
conventional weapons and dual-use 
goods and technologies.  






188  Outlaws production, storage and usage 
of chemical weapons.  





102 Voluntary additional safeguards on a 
nuclear and non-nuclear states nuclear 
energy programs. Allows for deeper 
inspections and transparency.  





156 Commits parties to not use, develop, 
produce, acquire, retain, stockpile, or 
transfer anti-personnel landmines. The 
U.S. is not a member.  





2 Limited strategic warheads to 1,700-
2,200. Did not focus on verification, 
nor delivery vehicles and storage 
warheads.  








83 Aims to interdict shipments of WMD 
and missiles that could be used to 
deliver or produce such weapons, to 
terrorists and countries suspected of 
trying to acquire WMD 




G8 Declaration on 
Addressing the 
Nuclear Threat28  
July 8, 2009 8 Endorsement by the G8 on moving 
toward a nuclear free world, 
strengthening the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and securing 
nuclear weapons and material from 
terrorists. Declaration of a nuclear 
summit in 2010.  







2 Attempts to prevent reuse of plutonium 
materials by having parties dispose of 
no less than 34 metric tons of 
plutonium each, or the total equivalent 
material from 17,000 weapons. 
Russia and the 









68 An international ban of unlimited 
duration on the use, acquisition, transfer 
or development of cluster munitions. 
Active with first 







2 Limited states to 1,550 deployed, 800 
deployed and non-deployed 
intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear 
armaments; and to deployed ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped 








Appendix 3: Missions Conducted by the European Union 
ESDP 
Mission Location Duration 
EUPM (EU Police Mission) Bosnia-Herzegovina 2003-
present 












EUMM (EU Monitoring Mission) Georgia 2008-
present 
EUSEC RD Congo (Security Sector reform mission) DR Congo 2005-
present 
EUPOL RD Congo (Policing assistance mission, 
succeeds EUPOL Kinshasa) 
DR Congo 2007-
present 
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Security sector reform 
mission) 
Guinea-Bissau 2008-2010
EUNAVFOR (anti-piracy mission) Somalia 2008-
present 
EUJUST LEX (Judicial training mission) Iraq 2005-
present 
EUBAM Rafah (Border assistance mission) Israel (Gaza)/Egypt 2005-
present 
EUPOL COPPS (Criminal justice and policing training 
mission) 
Palestinian Territories  2006-
present 
EUPOL Afghanistan (Police mission) Afghanistan 2007-
present 
EUFOR Concordia FYROM 2003 
EUPOL Proxima FYROM 2003-2005
EUJUST Themis (criminal justice reform mission) Georgia 2004-2005
EUPAT (police advisory mission) FYROM 2005-2006
Operation Artemis DR Congo 2003 
EUPOL Kinshasa (police training mission) DR Congo 2005-2007
AMIS (Support for African Union mission to Darfur - 
handed over to United Nations’ UNAMID) 
Sudan 2005-2007
EUFOR RD Congo (Support for United Nations’ 
MONUC electoral support mission) 
DR Congo 2006 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA (as part of joint EU-UN Mission) Chad/Central African 
Republic 
2008-2009
AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) 
EUTM Somalia 
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) 
Indonesia 
Somalia 











NATO Missions Since 1995  
Mission Location Duration Troop 
numbers 
(approx) 




KFOR Kosovo 1999-present 14,000 
NTM-I (Training mission) Iraq 2004-present   
Operation Active Endeavor Mediterranean Sea 2001-present   
AMISOM (supporting African 
Union) 
Somalia 2007-2010   
AMIS (supporting African Union) Sudan 2005-2007   
Operation Ocean Shield Offshore Horn of 
Africa 
2009-present   
Operation Ocean Provider Offshore Horn of 
Africa 
2008   
Operation Ocean Protector Offshore Horn of 
Africa 
2009   
(Earthquake relief mission) Pakistan 2005-2006   
IFOR, SFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-2004   
Operation Essential Harvest, 






Operation Unified Protector Libya 2011-present 
 
  
 
